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ITH the Republicans capturing both houses of Congress for
the first since the Eisenhower administration, employers ex-
pect to see a reduction in proposed legislation urging broader
rights and remedies for employees for employment discrimination. How-
ever, many in Congress continue to push for more legislation to increase
employee rights in the workplace and remedies for a breach of those
rights. Whether the proposed legislation will pass Congress is questiona-
ble.' Irrespective of the legislative branch of government, the judiciary
continues to play a very significant role in expanding employee rights and
remedies for conduct which adversely affects the terms and conditions of
employment.
The Texas courts continue to wrestle with wrongful discharge claims
which are pleaded more in the nature of tort claims, breach of employ-
ment, or contract claims. While plaintiffs continue to plead new theories
of recovery against their former employers or otherwise attempt to cir-
cumvent the employment-at-will doctrine, recent decisions in Texas and
in other states have demonstrated serious reservations concerning any
other exceptions to the at-will doctrine. 2 Nevertheless, developments in
1. This Survey is limited to developments in employment and labor law under the
Texas Constitution, statutes, and common law.
2. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985)
(fundamental change in employment-at-will doctrine should not be result of judicial deci-
sion); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31 (Cal. 1988) ("Legislatures, in
making such policy decisions, have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the ad-
vice of experts, and hold hearings at which all interested parties may present evidence and
express their views .... "); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982)
("Courts should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy .. "); Adler v.
American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981) ("declaration of public policy is nor-
mally the function of the legislative branch"); Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 1105 (N.M.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988); Murphy v. American Home Prods.
Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983) (holding:
If the rule of nonliability termination for of at-will employment is to be tem-
pered, it should be accomplished through a consequence of judicial resolu-
tion of the partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants .... The
Legislature has infinitely greater resources and procedural means to discern
the public will, to examine the variety of pertinent considerations, to elicit
the views of the various segments of the community that would be directly
affected and in any event critically interested, and to investigate and antici-
pate the impact of imposition of such liability.).
Id. at 89. See also Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983)("Courts should proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations."); Whitta-
ker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (holding:
[A]ny substantial change in the employee-at-will rule should first be micro-
scopically analyzed regarding its effect on the commerce of this state. There
must first be protection from substantial impairment of the very legitimate
interests of an employer in hiring and retaining the most qualified personnel
available or the very foundation of the free enterprise system could be jeop-
ardized. . . . Tennessee has made enormous strides in recent years in its
attraction of new industry of high quality designed to increase the average
per capita income of its citizens and thus, better the quality of their lives.
The impact on the continuation of such influx of new businesses should be
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employment law in Texas and throughout the other states demand careful
attention and study by employers and their counsel.
II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
The employment-at-will doctrine provides that employment for an in-
definite term may be terminated at will and without cause, absent an
agreement to the contrary.3 Although the Texas Legislature has enacted
statutory exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, 4 the doctrine has
carefully considered before any substantial modification is made in the em-
ployee-at-will rule.)
Id (emphasis added).
3. E.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Winters v.
Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990) (citing East Line &
R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888)); City of Alamo v. Montes, No.
13-92-533-CV, 1994 WL 93917, at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Mar. 24, 1995, n.w.h.);
Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., No. 01-94-00625-CV, 1995 WL 96777, at *4 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.], Mar. 9, 1995, n.w.h.); Cote v. Rivera, No. 03-94-00075-CV,
1995 WL 91565 (Tex. App.-Austin, Mar. 8, 1995, n.w.h.); Loftis v. Town of Highland
Park, No. 11-93-357-CV, 1995 WL 29915, at *1 (Tex. App.-Eastland, Jan. 12, 1995,
n.w.h.); Sebesta v. Kent Elect. Corp., 886 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]
1994, writ denied); Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1994, writ denied); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex.
App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855
S.W.2d 248, 254 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131,
133 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ denied).
4. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 125.001 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for exercising
rights under Agricultural Hazard Communication Act); TEX. Qv. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 122.001 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for jury service); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.§ 161.007 (Vernon 1986) (discharge for attending political convention); TEx. Gov'T CODE
ANN. §§ 431.005, 431.006 (Vernon 1990) (discharge for military service); id, § 554.002
(Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge of public employee for reporting violation of law to appro-
priate enforcement authority); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp.
1990) (discharge for refusing to participate in an abortion); id. art. 5182b, § 15 (Vernon
1987) (discharge for exercising rights under Hazard Communication Act); id art. 5547-300,
§ 9 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge due to mental retardation); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 101.052 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for membership or nonmembership in a union);
id. § 52.041 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for refusing to make purchase from employer's
store); id. § 52.051 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for complying with a subpoena); id.
§ 21.051 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge based on race, color, handicap, religion, national
origin, age, or sex); id. § 21.055 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge for opposing, reporting or
testifying about violations of the Commission on Human Rights Act); id. § 451.001
(Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge based on good faith workers' compensation claim); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(m) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (discharge due to withholding order for
child support); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon 1992) (discharge of
nursing home employee for reporting abuse or neglect of a resident).
There are also numerous federal statutory exceptions to an employer's right to discharge
an employee at will. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168 (West 1973 & Supp. 1990) (discharge for union activity, protected concerted
activity or filing charges or giving testimony); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-16 (West 1981 & Supp. 1990) (discharge on the basis of race, sex,
pregnancy, national origin and religion); Civil Rights Act of 1991, 29 U.S.C. § 626; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1981a, 1988, 2000e, 2000e-1, 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-16, 12111, 12112 and
12209 (1988) (discharged based on discrimination); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 11989) (discharge based on discrimina-
tion); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1985 & Supp. 1990) (discharge on
basis of disability in programs receiving federal funds); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 1870, and
1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985-1992, 1994-1996 (West 1988) (discharge for discrimina-
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remained intact, with only one narrow public policy exception, for the last
105 years.5 In 1985, the Texas Supreme Court created the only non-statu-
tory exception to the at-will doctrine in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v.
Hauck.6 The Sabine Pilot court held that public policy, as expressed in
tory reasons); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988)
(discharge of employees for exercising rights under the Act); Employment Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-1141 (1988) (discharge of employees to pre-
vent them from attaining vested pension rights); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C. §§ 215-216 (1988 & Supp. 11989) (discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act); Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 101-108 (1991) (discharge on basis of disability).
5. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); McClendon
v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 726; Sabine
Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v.
Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); Amador, 855 S.W.2d at 133 (refusing to create
additional public policy exceptions to the at-will rule); Jones v. Legal Copy, Inc., 846
S.W.2d 922, 925 Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) ("The employment-at-will
doctrine is the law of our state."); Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 838 S.W.2d 804,
808 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 846 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam); Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1994 WL 575520,
*9 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Oct. 20, 1994, writ requested) ("Texas continues to
remain committed to the judicially-created employment at-will doctrine."); Farrington v.
Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ
denied) (Texas adheres to the employment-at-will doctrine); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v.
Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); McAlister v. Me-
dina Elec. Co-op., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied);
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ
denied). See also Halkias v. General Dynamics Corp., 31 F.3d 224, 235 (5th Cir. 1994)
(Texas remains an employment-at-will state); Camp v. Ruffin, 30 F.3d 37, 38-39 (5th Cir.
1994) (Texas employees are terminable at-will); Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 981 F.2d
227, 230 (5th Cir. 1993); Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1993) (em-
ployment-at-will doctrine well settled in Texas); Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d
423, 426 (5th Cir. 1991) (at-will doctrine alive and well in Texas); Guthrie v. Tifco Indus.,
941 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1267 (1992) (recognizing only one
exception to at-will doctrine in Texas); Zimmerman v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d
469, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991) (Texas courts continue to follow
historical at-will rule); Spiller v. Ella Smithers Geriatric Ctr., 919 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir.
1990) (Texas Supreme Court "has decided that a public policy halo surrounds the at-will
doctrine"); Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989) (Texas courts not
hesitant to declare employment-at-will doctrine alive and well); Geise v. The Neiman Mar-
cus Group, Inc., No. H-91-2703, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1993); (Texas has long
followed the employment-at-will rule); Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y. of the
U.S., 805 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (Texas courts have long recognized the
employment at will doctrine); Knerr v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., No. H-90-3641, slip op. at 7
(S.D. Tex. July 28, 1992) (Texas follows the employment at will doctrine); Morton v. South-
ern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 1991) (recognizing
long-standing at-will rule in Texas); Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199,200 (S.D. Tex.
1991) (recognizing long-standing at-will doctrine in Texas); Taylor v. Houston Lighting and
Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (Texas courts have continuously recog-
nized employment-at-will rule); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 20, 1990) (at-will doctrine remains firmly entrenched in Texas common law). See
generally Garcia v. Reaves County, Tex., 32 F.3d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1994) (pursuant to
TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 85.003(c) (Vernon 1987) (deputies' employment is ter-
minable at-will and county commissioners have no authority to change that status).
6. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court in McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), aff'd on remand,
807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991), created a short-lived second exception and held that public
policy favoring the integrity in pension plans requires an exception to the employment-at-
will doctrine when an employee proves that the principal reason for his discharge was the
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the laws of Texas and the United States which carry criminal penalties,
required an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an em-
ployee has been discharged for refusing to perform a criminally illegal act
ordered by his employer.7 Since that decision, many discharged employ-
ees have unsuccessfully tried to bring their claim of wrongful discharge
within that exception.8
employer's desire to avoid contributing to or paying for benefits under the employee's
pension fund. Id. at 71. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that ERISA
preempted the McClendon common law cause of action. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClen-
don, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990). In 1990, the Texas Supreme Court declined an opportunity
to expand the public policy exception in Sabine Pilot or to adopt a private whistle blower
exception to the at-will doctrine. Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d
723, 723 (Tex. 1990). The Texas Whistle Blower Act, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-
16a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1991), protects state employees from adverse employment deci-
sions for reporting in good faith violation of law to an appropriate law enforcement author-
ity. For a complete discussion of Winters, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall,
Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 331, 334-36 (1991)
[hereinafter Pfeiffer & Hall, 1991 Annual Survey]. Assuming that the Texas SupremeCourt eventually recognizes a second exception to the at-will doctrine to protect private
employees from adverse employment decisions for reporting in good faith a violation of
law to an appropriate law enforcement authority, see Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 725, such a
cause of action will probably generate a significant amount of litigation. See Texas Dep't of
Human Servs. v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied) (jury
awarded $13,500,000 to a state employee discharged for reporting wrongdoings within his
agency); Janacek v. Triton Energy Corp., No. 90-07220-M (Dist. Ct, Dallas County, Tex.,
May 22, 1991) (jury awarded $124,000,000 to a former employee who was discharged for
refusing to sign an annual report allegedly containing misleading information). See also
City of Houston v. Leach, 819 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no
writ) (employee recovered damages after being discharged from employment for reporting
violations of law to the appropriate authorities) and Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d
742, 744 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ denied) (city employee discharged for reporting
violation of law recovered damages under Texas Whistle Blower Act).
7. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n.16(5th Cir. 1988) ("Sabine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted to instances where the
violations of law the employee refused to commit 'carry criminal penalties'" (quoting Sab-
ine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735)). But see Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing Co., 776 S.W.2d
768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). In Del Mar, the court held that
the Sabine Pilot exception necessarily covers a situation where an employee
has a good faith belief that her employer has requested her to perform an act
which may subject her to criminal penalties. Public policy demands that she
be allowed to investigate into whether such actions are legal so that she can
determine what course of action to take (i.e., whether or not to perform the
act).
Id. at 771.
8. E.g., Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d at 1000 (amended complaint that fails to
allege that plaintiff was ordered to violate laws that carried criminal penalties does not
state claim under Sabine Pilot); Guthrie, 941 F.2d at 379 (allegation that plaintiff was in-
structed to violate unspecified customs regulations does not state claim under Sabine Pi-
lot); Aitkens v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., No. 90-2884, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. June 14, 1991) (not
published) (dentist's contention that he was fired for refusing to violate ethical or profes-
sional standards or to engage in tortious activities insufficient under Sabine Pilot); Willy,
855 F.2d at 1171 n.16 (Sabine Pilot exception is limited to cases where the violations of law
which the employee refused to commit carry criminal penalties); Guerra-Wallace v. SER-
Jobs for Progress Nat'l, Inc., No. 3-92-CV-1319-X (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 1993) (plaintiff's
claim not within Sabine Pilot because her only allegation is that she was discharged for
"snitching" to the Department of Labor); Hoinski v. General Elec. Corp., No. 3-91-CV-
1034 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 1992) (plaintiff could meet Sabine Pilot test because one reason for
his termination was his admitted role in an improper pricing scheme); Gallagher v. Mans-
field Scientific, Inc., No. H-90-2999, slip op. at 4-5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 1991) (plaintiff's
1995] 1139
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In Higginbotham v. Allwaste, Inc.9 Don Higginbotham sued his former
employer, Allwaste, Inc., (Allwaste) after he was terminated for refusing
to allegedly make material overstatements to the company's internal au-
ditor. Higginbotham contended that these overstatements would have
misled the auditor which would have resulted in 'misrepresentation in
Allwaste's FCC reports. Higginbotham claimed that his termination for
refusing to participate in this allegedly illegal activity constituted wrong-
ful discharge under Sabine Pilot. Allwaste moved for summary judgment,
which the trial court granted. Higginbotham appealed, and the court of
appeals reversed. 10 Allwaste argued that Sabine Pilot required that
before liability could attach, Allwaste would directly confront Higginbot-
ham and make an affirmative statement that he will be discharged unless
he refused to perform the illegal act." The court rejected Allwaste's in-
terpretation because it would permit an employer to ask an employee to
perform an illegal act, without mentioning termination, and then termi-
nate the employee for insubordination if he refused.' 2 In that type of
situation, the employee is confronted with a Hobson's choice: engage in
illegal conduct or risk discharge for insubordination. 13 The court held
refusal to sell inter-aortic balloons he believed to be defective and unreasonably dangerous
and presenting risk of death or serious bodily injury not within Sabine Pilot exception);
Haynes v. Henry S. Miller Management Corp., No. CA3-88-2556-T, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 5, 1990) (discharge in retaliation for reporting illegal fraudulent expense reports of
former high-ranking management employees not within Sabine Pilot exception); McCain v.
Target Stores, No. H-89-0140, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1990) (discharge in retaliation
for investigating falsification of time cards by another employee not within Sabine Pilot
exception); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 724-25 (Texas Supreme Court declined to extend Sabine
Pilot to cover employees who reported illegal activities); Mott v. Montgomery County, 882
S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied) (employment-at-will does not
violate public policy, statutes, or common law of the state); Cooper v. Raiford, No. 09-93-
161-CV, 1994 WL 529945, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, Sept. 19, 1994, no writ) (termi-
nating employee because of cancer not within Sabine Pilot); Farrington v. Sysco Food
Servs., Inc., 865 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (em-
ployer's requirement that employee take a polygraph test not within Sabine Pilot excep-
tion); Medina v. Lanabi, Inc., 855 S.W.2d 161, 163-65 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1993, writ requested) (employees failed to bring claim within Sabine Pilot exception);
Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993) (discharged employee who claimed discharge
was due to her possession of information which could implicate the company in criminal
misconduct did not state claim under Sabine Pilot); Paul v. P.B.-K.B.B., Inc., 801 S.W.2d
229, 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (claim of discharge due to
objections to exploratory shaft for a nuclear waste storage project for Department of En-
ergy not within Sabine Pilot); Hancock v. Express One Int'l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634, 636-37
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (court declined to extend Sabine Pilot to include
employees discharged for performing illegal acts which carry civil penalties); Burt v. City
of Burkburnett, 800 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (claim
of discharged police officer that discharge was the result of his refusal not to arrest a prom-
inent citizen for public intoxication and thus refusing to perform an illegal act not within
Sabine Pilot).
9. Higginbotham v. Allwaste, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1994, writ denied).
10. Id. at 412.
11. Id. at 413.
12. Id.
13. Id at 416.
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that this choice was "unacceptable" and that the evidence created a fact
issue; therefore, the court reversed the summary judgment as to Higgin-
botham's wrongful discharge claim.' 4
In Ray v. Westlake Polymers Corporation'5 Harry Ray sued his former
employer, Westlake Polymers Corporation (Westlake) contending that he
was fired in retaliation for reporting safety hazards to the Occupational
Safety & Health Administration (OSHA). Ray argued that the exception
to the at-will employment doctrine recognized in Sabine Pilot6 should be
extended to prohibit an employer from discharging an employee who re-
ports OSHA violations. Westlake subsequently filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, which the district court granted. 17 The district court
stated that the Texas Supreme Court has not extended the Sabine Pilot
exception to this type of case. The district court disagreed with Ray's
suggestion that the Texas Supreme Court intended to expand the public
policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine. Rather, the district court noted
that the Texas state legislature would be the body most likely to craft new
exceptions to the at-will doctrine.' 8
In Ford v. Landmark Graphics Corp.19 Lori Ford sued her former em-
ployer, Landmark Graphics Corporation (Landmark), because she was
wrongfully terminated for reporting Landmark's illegal activities. Ford
sought a temporary injunction against Landmark to prohibit Landmark
from discharging her. The trial court refused to issue the injunction, and
the court of appeals affirmed. 20 The court reasoned that Ford was an at-
will employee and could be terminated for any cause except for those
reasons which are precluded by Texas law.2' The court held that the
Texas Whistleblowers' Act does not provide a cause of action to private
sector employees, but only to public employees. 22 Thus, Ford did not
have a viable cause of action and was not entitled to a preliminary
injunction.23
Similarly, in Burgess v. El Paso Cancer Treatment Center2 4 Russell Bur-
gess sued the El Paso Cancer Treatment Center (Center), a private em-
ployer, under a whistleblower theory. Burgess alleged that he learned of
a conspiracy among some of the employees to defraud the Center by theft
of its property. Burgess claimed that the employees removed good parts
from radiation machines and replaced them with defective parts. Burgess
14. Higginbotham, 889 S.W.2d at 416.
15. Ray v. Westlake Polymers Corp., No. H-93-3258 (S.D. Tex. May 16, 1994).
16. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
17. Ray, No. H-93-3258, slip op. at 8.
18. Id. at 9.
19. Ford v. Landmark Graphics Corp., 875 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, no
writ).
20. Id. at 34.
21. Id.
22. Ud. at 34-35. In Higginbotham, the court of appeals suggested in dicta that the
employee may have a private whistleblower's cause of action against his former employer.
889 S.W,2d at 414.
23. Ford, 875 S.W.2d at 35.
24. 881 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ denied).
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attempted to warn management of what he observed, but he was eventu-
ally discharged. The trial court granted the Center's special exceptions
and dismissed Burgess' claim, and the court of appeals affirmed. Based
upon the supreme court's decision in Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub-
lishing Co. 2 5 the court of appeals held that it was duty bound by the
higher court's precedent. 26
A. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party or
is left indefinite, either party may terminate the contract at will and with-
out cause. 27 During the past several years, however, wrongful discharge
litigation based on the violation of a written or oral employment agree-
ment has increased. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed
modify the at-will rule and require the employer to have good cause for
the discharge of an employee. 28
In Oliver v. BancTexas29 Susan Oliver was terminated for violating
BancTexas's attendance policy. The policy provided that an employee
was not permitted more than eight absences during a twelve-month pe-
riod. Because Oliver required medical treatment for a cytological cyst in
her neck and throat, she accumulated more than eight absences. Oliver
was then terminated from her employment. Oliver subsequently filed
suit against her former employer, asserting that BancTexas violated ER-
ISA, negligently supervised the human resources manager, and defamed
her. BancTexas filed a motion for summary judgment, which the federal
district court granted. 30
The district court noted that because Oliver, an at-will employee, vio-
lated BancTexas's attendance policy, BancTexas had the right to termi-
nate her.31 The district court also discounted Oliver's ERISA claim.32
25. 795 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1990).
26. 881 S.W.2d at 555-56. Justice Larsen urged the supreme court to adopt a private
whistleblower cause of action as set forth in Justice Doggett's concurring opinion in Win-
ters. Id. at 556 (Larsen, J., concurring) (citing Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 732 (Doggett, J.,
concurring)).
27. E.g., Papaila v. Uniden Am. Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440,445 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Federal
Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam); Schroeder v.
Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at
102; City of Alamo v. Montes, No. 13-92-533-CV, 1994 WL 93917 at *2 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi Mar. 24, 1995, n.w.h.); Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836
S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted); see also Philip J. Pfeiffer
& W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J.
97, 98-99 nn.8 & 9 (1988) (citing several cases discussing employment-at-will doctrine).
28. Papaila, 840 F. Supp. at 445; East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; Goodyear
Tire, 836 S.W.2d at 667-68; cf Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735 (court held that an at-will
employee may not be terminated for refusing to commit illegal act, noting statutory limita-
tions on employment-at-will doctrine). See generally Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-941
(1988) (employees of the state are generally at-will employees).
29. Oliver v. BancTexas, No. H-93-0698 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 1994).
30. Id. at 12.
31. Id. at 5-6.
32. Id. at 6.
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The court noted that all terminations have a negative effect upon bene-
fits. 33 This fact alone does not create an ERISA violation.34
1. Written Modifications of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee
must prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically pro-
hibited the employer from terminating the employee's service at will.35
The written contract must provide in a "special and meaningful way" 36
that the employer does not have the right to terminate the employment
relationship at will.37 The necessity of a written contract arises from the
statute of frauds requirement that an agreement which is not to be per-
formed within one year from the date of the making must be in writing to
be enforceable. 38
33. Id
34. Oliver, No. H-93-0698, slip op. at 6.
35. Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 991 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1993); Zimmerman v.
H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991)
(applying Texas law); Loftis v. Town of Highland Park, No. 11-93-357-CV, 1995 WL 29195
(Tex. App.-Eastland, Jan. 26, 1995, n.w.h.); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865
S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Lee-Wright, 840
S.W,2d at 577; Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, writ denied); Wilhite v. H.E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, no writ); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d
403,406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720
S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
36. Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., No. 01-94-00625-CV, 1995 WL 96777, at
*4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Mar. 9, 1995, n.w.h.); Lee Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840
S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Mar. 9, 1992, no writ) (quoting Benoit v.
Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)). See infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
37. Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. June 17,
1991); Knerr v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., No. H-90-3641 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 1992); City of
Alamo v. Montes, No. 13-92-533-CV, 1994 WL 93917 at *2 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
Mar. 24, 1995, n.w.h.); Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577; Rodriguez v. Benson Properties,
Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865
S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); McClendon v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816,818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), aff'd on remand, 807
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991) (citing Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
750 S.W.2d at 846; Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127. In Webber, the court
held that to establish a cause of action for wrongful discharge, the discharged employee
must prove that there was a written employment agreement that specifically provided that
the employer did not have the right to terminate the contract at will. 720 S.W.2d at 126. In
Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406, the court added that the writing must "in a meaningful and
special way" limit the employer's right to terminate the employment at will. But cf. Wi-
nograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied)
(court suggested that the phrase "in a special and meaningful way" is not a necessary part
of analysis).
38. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987); Rodriguez, 716 F.
Supp. at 277; Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Wi-
nograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310-11 (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982);
Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc. 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ
denied)); Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406.
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Where no actual employment contract exists, arguments have been
made that an employer's letter to an employee regarding his position or
salary (stated per week, month or year) may provide a basis upon which
the employee may argue that there is a written employment contract.
The cases, however, are somewhat difficult to reconcile and appear to be
decided on the specific facts involved. 39
A similar, but usually unsuccessful argument for avoiding the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is the argument that an employee handbook or em-
ployment application constitutes a contractual modification of the at-will
relationship.40 Texas courts have generally rejected such arguments, in-
stead adhering to the general rule that employee handbooks do not con-
stitute written employment agreements, provided the handbooks (1) give
the employer the right to unilaterally amend or withdraw the handbook,
(2) contain an express disclaimer that the handbook constitutes an em-
39. Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., No. 01-94-00625-CV, 1995 WL 96777, at
*4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Mar. 9, 1995, n.w.h.) (citing general rule); Lee-Wright,
840 S.W.2d at 577 (citing general rule). See Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310 (letter confirming
employment and annual salary held to be a contract of employment); Dobson v. Metro
Label Corp., 786 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (memorandum re-
flecting annual salary held insufficient to constitute a contract); W. Pat Crow Forgings, Inc.
v. Casarez, 749 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (letter agree-
ment promoting employee to supervisor and assuring employee that he could return to
previous position if he was not a satisfactory supervisor protected employee from at-will
termination); Dech v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 748 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (employer's subsequent confirmation letter re-
garding employment and employee's annual salary held not to be a written contract); see
also Molnar v. Engels, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (demand for annual salary indicates plaintiff assumed his employment agreement
was for 1-year term); Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (letter stating the salary and length of employment equated
to a contract for term of employment); Culkin v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 354 S.W.2d 397,400-
01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd) (letter presented jury question as to
terms of employment); Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (letter contemplating at least one year of employment to-
gether with plaintiff's detrimental reliance on contents of letter presented jury question);
Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902, 905-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, no writ)
(without specified period of service, the determination is fact sensitive). In Sornson v.
Ingram Petroleum Servs., Inc., No. H-86-3923 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1987), the plaintiff was
offered employment in a letter stating that he would be paid "at a rate of $58,000 per
year." After 9 months of employment, the plaintiff was discharged, and he sued for breach
of contract. The court stated that the sole issue was whether, under Texas law, an offer of
employment promising compensation and an annual rate creates, upon acceptance, an em-
ployment contract for a 1-year term, or whether such language merely establishes a rate of
pay under a contract of unlimited duration. The court held that, despite promising an
annual salary, the contract was of unlimited duration and therefore terminable at-will.
40. Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12,
1989) (not published); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; Glagola v. North Texas Mun. Water
Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Tex. 1989); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683
F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 156
(E.D. Tex. 1987); Cote v. Rivera, No. 03-94-00075-CV, 1995 WL 91565, at *4 (Tex. App.-
Austin, Mar. 8, 1995, n.w.h.); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410,
413 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; see also Brian K.
Lowry, The Vestiges of the Texas Employment-At-Will Doctrine in the Wake of Progressive
Law: The Employment Handbook Exception, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327 (1986) (applying
principles of consideration and mutuality to employment handbooks).
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ployment contract, or (3) do not include an express agreement mandating
specific procedures for discharging employees.41 Therefore, employee
claims of a contractual modification of the at-will relationship based on a
handbook have generally been unsuccessful. 42
Employment contracts may also modify the at-will rule. Texas follows
the general rule which provides that hiring at a stated sum per week,
month, or year is definite employment for the period named and may not
be ended at will.43 Once the employee meets his burden of establishing
that the contract of employment is for a term, the employer has the bur-
41. Spuler v. Pickar, 958 F.2d 103, 107 (5th Cir. 1992); Crum v. American Airlines,
Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1991); Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d at
471-72; Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458,462-63 (5th Cir. 1991); Falconer, No. 89-
2216, slip op. at 8-9; Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989); Joachim
v. AT & T Info. Sys., 793 F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1986); Blinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
No. SA-88-CA-1256, 1991 WL 329563, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 1991); Morton v. Southern
Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 1991); Perez v. Vinnell
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200-01 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; McAlister v.
Medina Elec. Co-op, Inc. 830 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ de-
nied); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. at 622; Abston v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 684 F. Supp. at 156; Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 283 (Tex.
1993) (per curiam); Washington v. Naylor Indus. Servs., Inc., No. 01-94-00244-CV, 1995
WL 70719, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Feb. 23, 1995, n.w.h.); Loftis v. Town of
Highland Park, No. 11-03-357-CV, 1995 WL 29915, at *2 (Tex. App.-Eastland, Jan. 26,
1995, n.w.h.); Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1994, n.w.h.); Johnson v. Randall's Food Mkts., Inc., 869 S.W.2d 390, 400 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995); Almazan v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 840 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied);
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ
denied); Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361, 370 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, writ denied); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Musquiz v. Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing
Co., No. 04-88-00093-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio, July 12, 1989, no writ) (not desig-
nated for publication); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538,539 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Salazar, 754 S.W.2d at 413; Stiver v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ);
Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 407; Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 128; Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities,
715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Totman v. Control Data Corp., 707
S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Vallone v. Agip Petroleum Co.,
705 S.W.2d 757,758 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg.
Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). But see
Texas Health Enters., Inc. v. Gentry, 787 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no
writ) (oral representation and portion of employee handbook supported breach of contract
finding). Contra Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a contract modifies at-will rule where employee handbook included detailed
procedures for discipline and discharge and expressly recognized an obligation to discharge
only for good cause).
42. Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. 1993) (per
curiam); Cote v. Rivera, No. 03-94-00075-CV, 1995 WL 91565, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin, Mar. 8, 1995, n.w.h.); Washington v. Naylor Indus. Servs., Inc., No. 01-94-00244-CV,
1995 WL 70719, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Feb. 23, 1995, n.w.h.); Loftis v.
Town of Highland Park, No. 11-03-357-CV, 1995 WL 29915, at *2 (Tex. App.-Eastland,
Jan. 26, 1995, n.w.h.); Almazan v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 840 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d at 69; McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at
818.
43. It. at 577 (citing Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
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den to establish good cause for the discharge."4 To establish a claim for
wrongful discharge, the employee has the burden to prove that he and his
employer had a contract that specifically provided that the employer did
not have the right to terminate the employment at-will and that the em-
ployment contract was in writing if the contract exceeded one year in
duration.45 Further, the writing must limit the employer's right to termi-
nate the employment at-will "in a meaningful and special way."' 46 For
example, employment based upon an annual salary limits "in a meaning-
ful and special way" an employer's prerogative to terminate an employee
during the period stated.47
In Loftis v. Town of Highland Parkl8 Dennis Loftis, a city employee
who served as a policeman, fireman and paramedic, was terminated by
the Town of Highland Park (Highland Park) after he administered the
wrong drug to a patient during an ambulance run. Loftis then filed suit
against Highland Park for wrongful discharge, alleging that the depart-
ment employment manual created a contract between himself and High-
land Park. The trial court granted Highland Park's motion for summary
judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held that Loftis
was an at-will employee and, consequently, Highland Park could termi-
nate his employment for any reason. Although the court acknowledged
that an at-will relationship may be modified by employer's statements re-
garding disciplinary procedures or termination rights, mere statements of
employment policy unaccompanied by an express agreement dealing with
the procedures for discharge does not create contractual employment
rights. 49 Therefore, Highland Park's employment manual, in which the
town stated that it could discharge employees for cause, does not serve to
limit the grounds by which Highland Park could terminate its
employees.50
44. Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ) (citing Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
45. Id. (citing Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d
124, 126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); see Papaila v. Uniden
Am. Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
46. Id (quoting Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
47. Id. (citing Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1990, writ denied)) (employer's agreement to hire employee for 5 years at a salary of
$2000 per month limits the employer's prerogative to terminate the employee's employ-
ment except for good cause).
48. Loftis v. Town of Highland Park, No. 11-93-357-CV, 1995 WL 29195 (Tex. App.-
Eastland, Jan. 26, 1995, n.w.h.).
49. Id. at *1.
50. Id.; Cote v. Rivera, No. 03-94-00075-CV, 1995 WL 91565, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-
Austin, Mar. 8, 1995, n.w.h.) (Travis County handbook did not create a contract); Mott v.
Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied)
(same).
1146 [Vol. 48
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
In Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enterprises, Inc.51 Mitchell Hussong sued
his former employer, Schwan's Sales Enterprises (Schwan's) after he was
allegedly fired. Hussong and Schwan's entered into a renewable one-year
written employment contract. The contract provided that Schwan's could
voluntarily terminate Hussong with thirty days' notice. In that instance,
Schwan's was required to pay Hussong $10,000 in severance pay. Eventu-
ally, Schwan's allegedly terminated Hussong and paid him the full
amount of the severance pay pursuant to the contract. Hussong filed a
lawsuit alleging breach of contract, which the trial court dismissed on
summary judgment. On appeal, Hussong argued that the contract re-
quired agreement on the part of both Hussong and Schwan's before
Schwan's could terminate Hussong's employment without cause. The
court disagreed with Hussong's interpretation of the written employment
contract. The court explained that a discharged employee who claims his
employer modified the at-will employment relationship, limiting the em-
ployer's ability to discharge, bears the burden to prove the limitation and
that the limitation restricts in a "meaningful and special way" the em-
ployer's right to terminate the employee. 52 The court acknowledged that
a contract provision which sets an annual salary limit is a "meaningful
and special" restriction upon an employer's ability to terminate without
cause.53 While Schwan's employment contract with Hussong appeared to
establish a limitation to the at-will employment relationship, the volun-
tary termination provision within the contract served to reserve to
Schwan's the right to terminate Hussong's employment without cause. 54
Therefore, the court of appeals determined that Hussong was an at-will
employee and Schwan's could terminate him without cause. 55
In Vida v. El Paso Employees Federal Credit Union56 Joanne Vida sued
her former employer, the El Paso Employees Federal Credit Union
(Credit Union), after she was terminated. Vida alleged that she was dis-
charged in retaliation for using the Credit Union's internal grievance pro-
cedures. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Credit Union
and Vida appealed. The court of appeals reversed. The court noted that
an employee handbook may modify the at-will relationship if the hand-
book specifically limits the employer's right, in a meaningful and special
51. Hussong v. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc., No. 01-94-00625-CV, 1995 WL 96777(Tex. App.-Houston f1st Dist.], Mar. 9, 1995, n.w.h.).
52. Id. at *4.
53. Id.
54. I& at *4-5.
55. Id. at *5. Next, Hussong contended that Schwan's breached the employment con-
tract by failing to provide him 30 days' notice of the voluntary termination. The court
explained that this does not constitute a breach of contract if the employee is paid wages or
salary for the specified notice period. Because of summary judgment evidence indicating
that Schwan's, did indeed, pay Hussong his salary for the period of the 30-day notice, the
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment against Hussong's breach of contract
claims. Hussong, 1995 WL 96777 at *5-6.
56. Vida v. El Paso Employees Fed. Credit Union, 885 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1994, no writ).
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way, to terminate the employee at-will.57 The court concluded that the
employer's handbook policy handbook specifically stated that an em-
ployee would not be terminated for using the grievance procedure; there-
fore, the handbook policy altered the at-will employment relationship
precluded the Credit Union from terminating Vida for using the griev-
ance procedure.5 8
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine
Usually, an employment relationship is created when employee and
employer orally agree to the terms and conditions of employment. Oral
employment contracts, however, may defeat an employer's right to termi-
nate an employee at will depending upon the terms of the agreement and
the facts and circumstances surrounding the employment.
An employee may avoid the at-will rule when an employer enters into
an oral agreement that the employee will be terminated only for good
cause. 59 An employee may also allege that the employer's oral assurance
of employment for a specified period of time (greater than one year) cre-
ates an enforceable contract of employment. Normally, the employer will
counter this argument by alleging that the agreement violates the statute
of frauds, which provides that an oral agreement not to be performed
within one year from the date of its making is unenforceable. 60 The dura-
tion of the oral agreement determines whether the statute of frauds ren-
ders the agreement invalid.61 When no period of performance is stated in
an oral employment contract, the general rule in Texas is that the statute
of frauds does not apply because the contract is performable within a
year.62 If an oral agreement can cease upon some contingency, other
than by some fortuitous event or the death of one of the parties, 63 the
57. Id. at 181.
58. Id.
59. Mansell v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 135 Tex. 31, 137 S.W.2d 997, 999-1000 (1940);
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W2d 664, 667-68 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992), aff'd, 879 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1994); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764
S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711
S.W.2d 331,336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d
90,93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Booker, 5
S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1928, no writ), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 852
(1929).
60. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(a)(6) (Vernon 1987); see Morgan, 764
S.W.2d at 827; see also Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 805 F. Supp.
1401, 1406 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
61. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Morgan, 764
S.W.2d at 827).
62. Id. at 468 n.4; Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978)
(interpreting Texas law); Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974);
Bratcher, 162 Tex. at 321-22, 346 S.W.2d at 796-97; Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 477, 154 S.W.2d
639; Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827; Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Robertson v. Pohorelsky, 583 S.W.2d 956, 958
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1969, no
writ)(If, by terms of oral employment agreement, its period is to extend beyond a year
from date of its making, "'the mere possibility of termination ... within a year because of
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agreement may be performed within one year, and the statutes of frauds
does not apply.64 Generally, the statute of frauds nullifies only contracts
that must last longer than one year. 65
The success of the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of
the employer's assurance.66 For example, an oral agreement for employ-
ment until normal retirement age is unenforceable because the agree-
ment must last longer than one year, unless the promisee is within one
year of normal retirement age at the time the promise is made.67 The
courts are split on the applicability of the statute of frauds to an oral
promise of lifetime employment. Some cases hold that the promise of
lifetime employment must be in writing,68 while other cases conclude that
such a promise does not need to be in writing because the employee
could conceivably die within one year of the oral promise. 69 The courts
are also split on the applicability of the statute of frauds to an oral prom-
ise of continued employment for as long as the promisee performs his
work satisfactorily.70 Some cases hold that such a promise must be in
writing,71 while other cases conclude that a writing is not required be-
cause the termination of employment could occur within a year of the
death or other fortuitous event does not render [the statute of frauds] inapplicable.'"
(quoting Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948))).
64. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463-64 (citing McRae v. Lindale Indep. School Dist., 450 S.W.2d
118, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); Fruth v. Gaston, 187 S.W.2d 581,
584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
65. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Morgan,
764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
66. Morgan, 764 S.W.2d at 827 (citing Niday, 643 S.W.2d at 920).
67. Crenshaw v. General Dynamics Corp., 940 F.2d 125, 128 (5th Cir. 1991); Papaila v.
Uniden Am. Corp., 840 F. Supp. 440,445 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works,
Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728
S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Hurt, 444 S.W.2d at 344; Green v. Texas Eastern Prods. Pipeline Co., No. H-89-1005, slip
op. at 6-7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1991).
68. Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 472-73 & n.3 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991); Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464; Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., 886
F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not designated for publication); Rayburn, 805 F. Supp,
at 1406; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342-43 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1992, writ denied); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webber v. M.W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 128 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. Chevalier, 147 Tex. at 110-11, 213 S.W.2d at 532; Central Nat'l Bank v. Cox, 96
S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ); see also Gilliam v. Kouchoucos,
340 S.W.2d 27, 27-28 (Tex. 1960) (oral contract of employment for 10 years not excluded
from statute of frauds by provision that it would terminate upon death of employee).
70. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-65 (applying Texas law and recognizing split of authority);
Rayburn, 805 F. Supp. at 1406 (noting conflict between Pruitt and Falconer).
71. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-66 (holding that it was bound to follow Falconer even
though the court recognized that Falconer is contrary to Texas law); Falconer, No. 89-2216,
slip op. at 8-9 (oral agreement of employment for as long as the employee "obeyed the
company rules and did his job" barred by the statute of frauds); Rodriguez v. Benson
Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (interpreting Texas law) (oral
agreement of employment so long as employee performed satisfactorily violates statute of
frauds); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 829 S.W.2d at 342-43 (holding oral promise of job for "as
long as I wanted it and made a good hand" barred by statute of limitations).
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oral promise.72 The law in this area is unclear in Texas and in the Fifth
Circuit. Hopefully, the Texas Supreme Court will have the opportunity to
resolve the confusion in the near future.
In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company v. Portilla73 Hortencia Portilla
was a seventeen-year employee of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company
(Goodyear). In violation of its anti-nepotism policy, Goodyear hired Por-
tilla's brother a few years after Portilla, and he served as Portilla's super-
visor for more than fifteen years. The first and second levels of Goodyear
management knew of the familial relationship between Portilla and her
supervisor, but ignored the violation. In 1987, Goodyear "rediscovered"
the violation of the anti-nepotism policy and ordered Portilla to transfer
to another facility. For various reasons, Portilla could not transfer, and
Goodyear terminated her employment. Portilla argued that Goodyear's
action was a wrongful termination because Goodyear waived its anti-nep-
otism policy as to Portilla. The Texas Supreme Court agreed. 74 The court
acknowledged that Portilla was an at-will employee, 75 but found that
Goodyear altered the at-will relationship by establishing a specific ground
upon which it would not terminate Portilla - violation of the anti-nepo-
tism policy.76 The court held that Goodyear waived its right to terminate
Portilla for violating the policy by knowingly allowing Portilla to violate
the anti-nepotism policy. 77 Therefore, under Portilla, an employer may
alter an at-will employment relationship by waiving a specific ground for
discharge. 78
In Shaheen v. Motion Industries, Inc.79 Norman Shaheen sued Motion
Industries for wrongful discharge based upon breach of an oral contract.
Shaheen alleged that Motion Industries entered into an oral contract with
him when it announced at a trade show that Shaheen would be the com-
pany's new representative in a new office. Subsequently, Motion Indus-
tries terminated Shaheen. Motion Industries moved for summary
judgment on the basis that Shaheen was an at-will employee, and the trial
court granted the summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed.
Shaheen presented evidence that he would serve as the representative for
nine months. Because the oral contract, if it did exist, could be dis-
charged in less than a year, the oral contract did not violate the statute of
. 72. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 836 S.W.2d at 669-70; McRae, 450 S.W.2d at 124;
Hardison v. A. H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no
writ). See also Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 91-93 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff stated cause of action for breach of express employment
contract by alleging that his at-will status was modified by oral agreements with supervi-
sory personnel that he would not be terminated except for good cause and that his employ-
ment would continue so long as his work was satisfactory).
73. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 879 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1994).
74. Id. at 48.
75. Id. at 50.
76. Id. at 51-52.
77. Id.
78. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 879 S.W.2d at 52.
79. Shaheen v. Motion Indus., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994,
writ denied).
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frauds.80 Considering this evidence, the court of appeals held that sum-
mary judgment was improper because there was a question of fact regard-
ing the existence of an enforceable oral contract.
In Latour v. FMC Corp.81 George Latour complained of his termina-
tion from FMC Corp. because of oral assurance of continued employ-
ment.8 2 The district court granted FMC Corp.'s motion for summary
judgment because its assurances did not constitute a promise to employ
Latour for any specific period of time;83 therefore, the assurances did not
change Latour's employment from its at-will status.84
In Orr v. Champion International Corp.85 George Orr sued his former
employer, Champion International Corp., alleging, inter alia, breach of
implied contract. Orr was terminated by Champion six months after be-
ing hired. The federal district court granted Champion's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the isue of whether Champion breached an implied
contract for a specific term of employment.8 6 The district court noted
that it would not imply a contract for a term of employment merely from
Champion's representations that Orr would be working on certain
projects that would require two or three years to complete.8 7 These state-
ments, the court held, did not alter Orr's at-will status.88
In Oliver v. BancTexas89 Susan Oliver was terminated for violating
Banc-Texas' attendance policy. Oliver sued and argued that she had an
oral employment contract based upon Gerstacker v. Blum Consulting En-
gineers.90 Oliver contended that her former employer promised that she
would not be terminated as long as his work performance remained satis-
factory. Based upon that promise, Oliver accepted employment with
BancTexas and relocated. A short time later, when business took a
downturn, BancTexas terminated Oliver. BancTexas responded to Oli-
ver's breach of contract claim based upon the statute of frauds.
Analyzing BancTexas' statute of frauds claim, the court of appeals rea-
soned that the statute will bar only those oral contracts that cannot be
performed within one year.91 The statute of frauds, however, does not
apply to indefinite term employment contracts. 92 These contracts are in-
ferred to be performable within one year.93 On the other hand, if a court
can imply a definite term from the parties' understandings at the time the
contract was formed and that term is greater than one year, the oral con-
80. Id. at 91.
81. Latour v. FMC Corp., No. H-91-1788 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 1994).
82. Latour, slip op. at 6-8.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id.
85. Orr v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-93-1487 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1994).
86. Orr, slip op. at 4-5.
87. Id. at 5.
88. Id.
89. Oliver v. BancTexas, No. H-93-0698 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 1994).
90. 884 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied).





tact is barred by the statute of frauds.94 The court determined that it
could not imply a definite term.95 The court reasoned that Oliver's plead-
ing, requesting damages in the amount of eighteen months' salary, was
not conclusive evidence that the parties contemplated a definite term of
employment. 96 Rather, the alleged promises of long-term employment
were completely open-ended and did not imply a definite time period. 97
Therefore, the court reversed BancTexas' summary judgment based upon
the statute of frauds.98
3. Estoppel
In Latour v. FMC Corp.99 George Latour was reassigned by FMC Cor-
poration, with the alleged promise that he would be reclassified to a
higher position after a short training period. The reclassification never
occurred. Eventually, Latour's position was eliminated pursuant to
FMC's efforts to cut costs. Latour then sued FMC, claiming equitable
estoppel. 100 Reviewing Latour's claim on summary judgment, the district
court determined that Latour did not established detrimental reliance. 1 1
Latour asserted that he took the reassignment to avoid being laid off.
Although Latour claimed that he relied on the promise of a reclassifica-
tion and gave up a severance package and other employment as a result,
the court discounted Latour's claim of detrimental reliance. 10 2 The court
reasoned that Latour did not establish that he sacrificed specific job op-
portunities by taking the reassignment. 10 3 Also, Latour earned a salary in
the reassigned position in lieu of obtaining the severance package. The
district court therefore found that Latour had not suffered a detriment by
accepting the reassignment. 104 Because Latour could not establish this
essential element of an equitable estoppel cause of action, the court held
that FMC was entitled to summary judgment.' 05
In Orr v. Champion International Corp. 106 George Orr sued Champion
International Corp., his former employer, alleging promissory estoppel
based upon Champion's statements that Orr would work on long-term
94. Id. at 849-50.
95. Gerstacker, 884 S.W.2d at 850-51.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 851.
98. Id.
99. Latour v. FMC Corp., No. H-91-1788 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 1994).
100. To establish equitable estoppel a plaintiff is required to show that (1) the defend-
ant made a false presentation or concealed material facts; (2) the representation or con-
cealment was made with knowledge of those facts; (3) the defendant intended that the
plaintiff rely upon the representation or concealment; (4) the plaintiff did not know and
had no means of knowing of the concealment or the falsity of the representation; and (5)
the plaintiff relied to his or her detriment on the representation or concealment. Id. (citing
Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1991)).
101. Latour, No. H-91-1788, slip op. at 4-5.
102. Id. at 4.
103. Id. at 5.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Orr v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-93-1487 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1994).
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projects.10 7 On motion for summary judgment, the district court deter-
mined that Orr did not establish all of the elements of a promissory es-
toppel claim.10 8 The court noted that Champion did not make any
express or specific promise to employ Orr for any specific period of
time; 09 therefore, Orr's promissory estoppel claim failed as a matter of
law." 0
In Vida v. El Paso Employees Federal Credit Union"' Joanne Vida
sued her former employer, the El Paso Employees Federal Credit Union
(Credit Union), after she was terminated. Vida contended that she was
discharged in retaliation for using the employer's internal grievance pro-
cedures. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Credit Union
and Vida appealed. The court of appeals reversed. The court explained
that while promissory estoppel does not create a contract when one does
not previously exist, 112 it does preclude an individual from asserting a
legal right if it would be unjust." 3 The court held that the summary judg-
ment evidence created a fact issue because the Credit Union's assurance
of no retaliation for use of the internal grievance procedure constituted a
promise that the employer, in that situation, would not enforce its legal
right to terminate an employee at will. 114
107. Orr, slip op. at 6-7. To establish a claim for promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must
show that a promise was made, that the defendant could foresee that the defendant would
rely on that promise and the plaintiff did substantially rely on the promise, to his or her
detriment. Id. at 6.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 6-7.
110. Orr, No. H-93-1487, slip op. at 7.
111. Vida v. El Paso Employees Fed. Credit Union, 885 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1994, no writ).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 182.
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4. Intentional Infliction of Severe Emotional Distress
Under Texas law, to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, 115 the Texas Supreme Court'1 6 and courts of
appeals," 7 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 18 and the federal district
115. The Texas Supreme Court has specifically rejected the tort of negligent infliction
of emotional distress. Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993); Daigle v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 893 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ requested); Farrington v.
Sysco Food Servs., 856 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
The following cases hold that no cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress arises out of termination of employment: Brunnemann v. Terra Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d
175, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1992); Conaway v. Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d 358, 361 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 186 (1992); Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1253
n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); Geise v. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc., No. H-91-2703 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5,
1993); White v. H.S. Fox Corp., No. 3:92-CV-0628-H (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 1993); Clayton v.
Nabisco Brands, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Austin v. Champion Int'l
Corp., No. H-87-1845, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 1992); Soto v.
City of Laredo, 764 F. Supp. 454, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Taylor v. Houston Lighting and
Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301-02 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Sauls v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 750
F. Supp. 783, 790 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Nichols v. Columbia Gas Dev., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 9, 1990); Williams v. Sealed Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E, 1990 WL 102799, at *3(N.D. Tex. 1990); Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex.
1988); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ
granted) (argued Mar. 8, 1994). Additionally, if an employee's emotional distress claim
arises during the course and scope of his employment and the employer is a subscriber
under the Workers' Compensation Act, the employee's claim for emotional distress is
barred by the Act and his remedy is for workers' compensation benefits under the Act.
Schauer v. Memorial Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437, 452 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,
no writ); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1992, writ denied).
116. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 743 (Tex. 1993) (observing that in TWyman
v. IWyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex. 1993) the supreme court adopted the elements of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SEC.
OND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)); Diamond Shamrock Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844
S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1992).
117. Cote v. Rivera, No. 03-94-00075-CV, 1995 WL 91565, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Austin,
Mar. 8, 1995, n.w.h.); Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1994
WL 575520 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], Oct. 20, 1994, writ denied); Cooper v. Rai-
ford, No. 09-93-161CV, 1994 WL 529945, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Beaumont, Sept. 19, 1994,
no writ); Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods Corp., 878 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi, writ denied); Shaheen v. Motion Indus., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 88, 92 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied); Garcia v. Andrews, 867 S.W.2d 409 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1993, no writ); Reeves v. Western Co. of North Am., 867 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1993, writ requested); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., 865 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.], 1993, writ denied); Qualicare v. Runnels, 863 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1993, writ dism'd); Schauer v. Memorial Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-EI
Paso 1993, writ denied); Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co., 848 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont), rev'd on other grounds, 858 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1993); Benavides v. Moore, 848
S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
118. See Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network, Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 269 n.28 (5th Cir. 1994);
Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3 F.3d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1993); Oldham v. Western Ag-Miner-
als Co., No. 93-2440, slip op. at 5 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1994); Danawala v. Houston Lighting &
Power Co., 4 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1993); McKethan v. Texas Farm Bureau, 996 F.2d 734 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994); Chance v. Rice University, 984 F.2d 151 (5th
Cir. 1993); Ugalde v. W.A. McKenzie Asphalt Co., 990 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1993); Johnson v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1992); Ramirez v. Allright
Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1992); Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d
374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1267 (1992); Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co.,
939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d 300, 306 (5th
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courts1 19 have consistently required plaintiffs to establish a level of con-
duct that is "extreme and outrageous" as that term is defined in the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. 120 Whether conduct "is extreme and
outrageous" is a question of law for the court. 12' As predicted by Justice
Hecht in Wornick Co. v. Casas, the supreme court's failure to articulate
Cir. 1989); see also Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc., No. 92-4338, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19908, at *15 n.14 (5th Cir. 1993).
119. Smith v. Block Drug Co., No. H-92-2431 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 1994); Oldham v. West-
ern Ag-Minerals Co., No. 93-2440 (5th Cir. Jan. 27, 1994) (not designated for publication);
Guerra-Wallace v. SER-Jobs for Progress Nat'l, Inc., No. 3:92-CV-1319-X (N.D. Tex. Nov.
18, 1993); Dailey v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., No. 3:91-CV-1327-X (N.D. Tex Nov. 9,
1993); Severson v. Derbyshire, No. H-93-92-2490 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 1993); Powell v. Vista
Chem. Co., No. H-93-1781 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 1993); Estelle v. Neiman-Marcus Group, Inc.,
No. 3:92-CV-2035-H (N.D. Tex. July 30, 1993); Robinson v. Ameriscribe Management
Servs., Inc., No. 3:93-CV-1167-G (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 1993); Jefferson v. St. Luke's Episco-
pal Hosp., No. H-91-008, slip op. at 18-19 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 1993); Hoinski v. General
Elec. Corp., No. 3:91-CV-1034-G (N.D. Dec. 4, 1992); Anderson v. Electronic Data Sys.
Corp., No. 3:91-CV-1489-G (N.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 1992); Garcia v. Pepsi-Bottling Group, 60
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 464 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8, 1992); Clayton v. Nabisco Brands, Inc.,
804 F. Supp. 882 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Garcia v. Webb, 764 F. Supp. 457, 460 (S.D. Tex. 1991);
Lucas v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2175 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 1991); Young v. Dow
Chem. Co., No. H-90-1145, 1991 WL 138322, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1991); Davis v.
Exxon Co., No. H-89-2806 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 1991); Green v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline
Co., No. 89-1005 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 1991); Hoose v. T.I.R.R., No. H-90-2153 (S.D. Tex.
June 10, 1991); Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301 (S.D. Tex.
1990); Koehler v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., No. H-89-909 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Perez
v. Airco Carbon Group, Inc., No. C-88-13, 1990 WL 128231, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 1990);
Castillo v. Horton Automatics, No. C-88-199 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1990); Williams v. Sealed
Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E, 1990 WL 102797, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1990); Benavides v.
Woodforest Nat'l Bank, No. H-87-3094 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1989); In re Continental Air-
lines, Corp., 64 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-
1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 1990); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F.
Supp. 994, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Nichols v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D.
Tex. Nov. 14, 1990); Ismail v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., No. 90-1817 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 1990);
Austin v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761, at *9 (S.D.
Tex. 1990); Starrett v. Iberia Airlines of Spain, 756 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D. Tex. 1989);
Yarbrough v. La Petite Academy, No. H-87-3967 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1989); Fiorenza v. First
City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988); Laird v. Texas Commerce
Bank-Odessa, 707 F. Supp. 938,941 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F.
Supp. 152, 157 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
120. Liability for outrageous conduct exists
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the
case in which outrageous conduct is found is one in which the recitation of
the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resent-
ment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!".
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cnt. d (1965).
Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances,
petty oppression, or other trivialities .... [Tihe rough edges of our society
are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs
must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain
amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsid-
erate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to intervene in every case
where someone's feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to express an
unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left through which irasci-
ble tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.
Id.
121. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring).
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any principles for concluding what behavior constitutes "extreme and
outrageous" conduct has resulted in inconsistent results by the courts of
appeals, particularly in summary judgment cases. 122 Justice Hecht's con-
clusion is demonstrated by a review of the appellate court decisions, both
published and unpublished.
In Randall's Food Markets v. Johnson,123 Mary Lynn Johnson, a store
manager, was terminated from employment after she allegedly stole a
Christmas wreath from her employer, Randall's. While Johnson
purchased several items from the store on one occasion, she did not pay
for a large Christmas wreath that she was carrying. The check-out clerk
did not charge Johnson for the twenty-five dollar wreath because he
asked her if she had anything else and she said that she did not. The clerk
reported the incident to management. When Johnson returned to the
store two days later, she was escorted to the back of the store and ques-
tioned about the wreath. She admitted that she did not pay for the
wreath and said that she had a lot on her mind. Because another supervi-
sor wanted to talk to her later, Johnson was asked to remain in the room
or work on a project painting a booth for a volunteer project. The super-
visor did not think it would be a good idea for Johnson to be on the floor.
Johnson elected to remain in the office. Johnson left the room twice: to
use the restroom and to visit a friend in the floral department and to pay
for the wreath. Later, Johnson was questioned by both supervisors as to
how she could forget to pay for the wreath when she was checking out
with other items at the same time. Johnson began to cry. She was told
that she would be suspended for thirty days without pay and then given
the option of working at another, nearby Randall's. Johnson never re-
ported for work. Johnson filed suit against Randall's claiming intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for the Randall's and Johnson appealed. The court of appeals re-
versed, the judgment as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim124 and the Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
affirmed the summary judgment.
The supreme court observed that the conduct that Johnson alleges was
extreme and outrageous was her supervisors' questioning of her regard-
ing the wreath. Johnson claimed that one of the supervisor's tone and
manner was curt and severe. Apparently Johnson explained her version
of the wreath incident. Accepting all of Johnson's allegations as true, the
supreme court concluded that neither Randall's not its agents engaged in
122. Justice Hecht wrote:
With the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Court em-
barks on what I predict will be an endless wandering over a sea of factual
circumstances, meandering this way and that, blown about by bias and incli-
nation, and guided by nothing steadier than the personal preferences of the
helmsmen, who change with every watch.
Id. at 737 (Hecht, J., concurring).
123. 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995).
124. Id. at 643.
1156 [Vol. 48
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
extreme and outrageous conduct. 125 The court observed that an em-
ployer is within its legal right to question a management level employee
about a report of wrongdoing. 126 Contrary to being "extreme and outra-
geous," the court found Randall's conduct is "a managerial function that
is necessary to the ordinary operation of a business organization."'1 27
In Sebesta v. Kent Electronics Corporation"28 Vicki Sebesta sued her
former employer, Kent Electronics Corporation (Kent) for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress. Sebesta alleged two grounds for her claim:
first, her termination violated the Juror Reemployment Act, and the stat-
utory prohibition against such a discharge constitutes extreme and outra-
geous conduct per se; and, second, the manner of her termination was
extreme and outrageous. The trial court granted Kent's motion for sum-
mary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.129 First, the court of
appeals held that a violation of the Juror Reemployment Act standing
alone, even though illegal, did not create anything more than a cause of
action under the Act.130 Second, the court found that the manner of
Sebesta's discharge was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law.131
The court observed that while tempers briefly flared and the parties ar-
gued, termination is never pleasant, and the conduct did not reach the
level of extreme and outrageous.132
In Beiser v. Tomball Hospital Authority133 John Beiser, a lab techni-
cian, reported to his supervisor and to the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) that the Hospital in which he worked was storing blood samples in
violation of FDA rules. Two days later, Beiser was terminated. Subse-
quently, Beiser filed suit, and his attorney informed the Hospital that
Beiser was invoking the Hospital's grievance procedure and the Hospital
had thirty days to conclude those procedures. The attorney also informed
the Hospital that Beiser would file suit at the completion of those proce-
dures. Beiser later sued the Hospital alleging a claim under the
Whistleblower Act and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 134 The
Hospital filed a motion for summary judgment as to the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim, and the trial court granted the motion.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. Following its decision in
Sebesta, the court held that a violation of the Whistleblower Act does not
125. Id. at 644.
126. Id. (citing Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 34 (5th Cir.
1992)).
127. Id. (citing Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Tex. 1993)).
128. Sebesta v. Kent Electronics Corp., 886 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ denied).
129. Id. at 462-64.
130. Id. at 462.
131. Id. at 463-64.
132. Id. at 464. The manner of termination is very similar to the termination of the
employee in Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733-34 (Tex. 1993). Sebesta, 886 S.W.2d at 463.
133. Beiser v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., No. 01-94-00223-CV, 1995 WL 49488 (Tex. App.-
Houston [lst Dist.], Feb. 9, 1995, n.w.h.).
134. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 554.001 (Vernon 1994).
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constititute extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. 135 The
court also held that giving Beiser a memorandum containing negative in-
formation about his job performance did not constitute extreme and out-
rageous conduct as a matter of law. 136
In Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods Corp.137 Deborah Ewald filed suit
against her former employer, Wornick Family Foods Corporation
(Wornick), for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ewald quit her
employment and reported her crew leader, Oscar Alonzo, for sexual har-
assment, which resulted in Alonzo's termination. After his termination,
Ewald returned to work. Ewald complained that when she returned to
work other employees stared at her and circulated rumors about her, and
that as a result, she experienced headaches and an upset stomach. Ewald
later sued. Wornick filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial
court granted. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that rude behavior
does not equate to extreme and outrageous conduct, even if it is
tortious. 138
In Denius v. Morton139 Thomas Morton sued Frank Denius for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Morton was vice-president and
general counsel of Southern Union, and Denius was chairman of the
board of directors, president and chief executive officer. The board dis-
charged Morton for violating Denius's instructions in settling and author-
izing payment in settlement of litigation involving Lanco. The trial court
granted Denius's motion for summary judgment, and Morton appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed. Morton alleged that the following conduct
constituted extreme and outrageous conduct: Denius's repeatedly threat-
ening to reduce Morton's salary from $150,000 to $120,000, though he
had no authority to do so; informing Morton that he was considering dis-
charging him; accusing Morton of entering into the Lanco settlement
withour authorization; failing to tell Morton why the board was consider-
ing firing him; and urging the board to terminate Morton. 40 Comparing
Denius' conduct to the conduct in Casas, the court held that Denius' con-
duct was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. 141
In Cooper v. Raiford'42 Bill Cooper sued his former employers, Aubrey
Raiford and Raiford Buick GMC Trucks (Raiford), for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress arising out of his alleged wrongful discharge in
135. Beiser, 1995 WL 49488 at *3 (citing Prunty v. Arkansas Freightways, Inc., 16 F.3d
649 (5th Cir. 1994); Sebesta, 886 S.W.2d at 464).
136. Id.
137. Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods Corp., 878 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1994, writ denied).
138. Id. at 660 (citing Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. 1994)).
139. No. 05-92-02501-CV, 1994 WL 159847 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Apr. 28, 1994, no writ)
(not published).
140. Id. at *6.
141. Id
142. Cooper v. Raiford, No. 09-93-161-CV, 1994 WL 529945 (Tex. App.-Beaumont,
Sept. 29, 1994, no writ).
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violation of article 8307c.143 The lawsuit arose out of an on-the-job injury
Cooper suffered. Cooper filed and pursued a workers' compensation
claim, and Raiford terminated Cooper. Cooper sued, contending that he
was terminated because of the claim.
In Hooper v. Pitney Bowes'4 Pitney Bowes investigated a sales man-
ager, Elaine Hooper, who conducted emotionally charged sales meetings
and private encounters that were described by attendees as "cultlike."
One of Hooper's superiors desciber Hooper as being "in the occult," "un-
Christian," "cultist," "a witch," "a sorceress," and "satanistic." Hooper
sued her supervisor and Pitney Bowes for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The jury found the supervisor liable, but not Pitney
Bowes. Hooper and the supervisor appealed. Initially, the court of ap-
peals held that the statements made about Hooper were extreme and out-
rageous because a high degree of opprobrium attaches to such terms and
affirmed the intentional infliction of emotional distress finding.145 Then
the court of appeals reversed that portion of the judgment in which
Pitney Bowes was found not liable. 146 Based upon the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, the court held that all of the supervisor's conduct was
within the course and scope of his employment. 147 The court based its
holding on the fact that the supervisor was a manager, that his duties
included controlling the actions of Hooper, and that all of the complained
of statements were made in the process of investigating Hooper's actions
at her motivational meetings. 148 The court rejected Pitney Bowes' argu-
ment that the case was within the exception to the general rule of respon-
deat superior liability based on an employee's unforeseeable intentional
and malicious acts because it is reasonably foreseeable that a manager
might mismanage an investigation of an employee to the extent of com-
mitting intentional infliction of emotional distress. 149
In Higginbotham v. Allwaste, Inc.'50 Don Higginbotham filed suit
against Allwaste, Inc. (Allwaste) for intentional infliction of emotional
distress after he was terminated from employment because he refused to
engage in illegal conduct as directed by Allwaste. The trial court granted
summary judgment to Allwaste, and the court of appeals reversed.' - '
The court held that terminating an employee because he or she chose not
to participate in an illegal act may constitute extreme and outrageous be-
havior, thereby creating a fact issue.' 5 2 The court also considered
143. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon 1993), repealed by Act of May 2,
1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 269, § 5(1), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1273.
144. No. 06-94-00034-CV, 1995 WL 37313 (Tex. App.-Texarkana, Jan. 31, 1995,
n.w.h.).
145. Id. at *2.
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id. at *4.
148. Id at *3.
149. Harper, 1995 WL 37313 at *4.
150. Higginbotham v. Allwaste, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 411, 416-17 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist. 1994, writ denied).
151. Id. at 417.
152. Id. at 416-17.
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whether Higginbotham's distress was severe. 153 Allwaste noted that Hig-
ginbotham never received treatment for his alleged suffering. However,
the court found that a lack of treatment does not conclusively establish as
a matter of law that a plaintiff's distress is not severe. 154 The court found
that the evidence that Higginbotham was depressed, confused, frightened
angry and suffered changes in his physical appearance was sufficient to
create a fact issue as to whether Higginbotham's emotional distress was
severe.' 55 The court discounted Allwaste's argument that his emotional
distress was not severe because Higginbotham returned to Allwaste on a
contract basis a few weeks after being terminated. 156 Therefore, the case
was reversed for a trial on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 157
In McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc.'58 John McCray was terminated from
employment with DPC Industries, Inc. after he was involved in an alter-
cation with another DPC employee. McCray filed against DPC a suit
alleging violations of Title VII and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. McCray listed three events as the basis of his emotional distress
claim: (1) his supervisors failed to diffuse the potentially explosive situa-
tion between McCray and the other DPC employee; (2) DPC employees
yelled racial slurs at him; and (3) the other DPC employees threatened
him with a gun on DPC property. In response to DPC's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the district court held that none of the alleged conduct
constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. 159 First, the court
noted that although it did not condone the use of racial epithets, such
behavior does not support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress.' 60 Also, the court found that DPC was not responsible for the
behavior of its volatile employee. 161 The court noted that none of the
DPC employee's offensive conduct fell within the scope of his general
authority, furthered DPC's business or accomplished a goal for which the
DPC employee was hired.' 62 Moreover, the court held that McCray's
emotional distress claim could not prevail because McCray did not suffer
severe distress.' 63 McCray claimed that he had suffered sleeplessness,
anxiety, trauma and fright because of the offensive events. The court rea-
soned that because McCray never sought treatment for these complaints,





158. McCray v. DPC Indus., Inc. and Terry Lee Pierce, No. 2:94-CV-45 (E.D. Tex. Feb.
2, 1995).
159. Id. at 18.
160. Id at 15; see Smith v. Block Drug Co., No. H-92-2431 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 1994)
(noting that racial or sexual harassment will not, by itself, support claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
161. McCray, No. 2:94-CV-45, slip op. at 17.
162. Id. at 16.
163. Id. at 17.
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McCray's emotional distress could not be severe. 164 For these reasons,
the district court granted DPC's motion for summary judgment.
In Orr v. Champion International Corp. 165 George Orr sued his former
employer, Champion International Corp., for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Orr alleged that Champion caused him to suffer emo-
tional distress by terminating his employment without warning. The dis-
trict court noted that ordinary employment disputes will not support this
kind of claim.' 66 Moreover, the conduct of which Orr complained was
much less offensive than the conduct of many other employers which the
Fifth Circuit found not to be actionable. 167 Terminating without warning
simply is not conduct that exceeds all bounds of decency.168 Therefore,
the district court dismissed Orr's claim.169
In Hadley v. Vain P. T.S. 170 Conrell Hadley sued Vam P.T.S, his former
employer, for various employment-related claims including intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The jury found for Hadley on this claim
and awarded $150,000 in punitive damages. However, the jury was not
asked to determine whether Hadley suffered any actual damages result-
ing from the emotional distress. Vam P.T.S. subsequently appealed the
$150,000 punitive damages award, asserting that such an award was im-
proper in the absence of any actual damages. The Fifth Circuit agreed. 1
7
'
The court noted that the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Federal Ex-
press v. Dutschmann 72 reaffirmed that a finding of actual damages is a
prerequisite to a punitive damages award. 173 Therefore, the court re-
versed the award of punitive damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 174
5. Drug Testing
In Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.175 the Quaker Oats Company
(Quaker Oats) withdrew a job offer given to Jane Doe after Doe tested
positive for the presence of opiates in a pre-employment drug screening
test. Doe brought suit against Quaker and SmithKline Beecham Corpo-
ration (SmithKline), the drug testing laboratory. Doe alleged that
Quaker and SmithKline were negligent in their failure to warn her to
refrain from poppy seed consumption before the test or to inquire about
consumption of poppy seeds on the pretesting questionnaire, negligent in
their failure to properly review her test results or to conduct additional
164. Id. at 17-18.
165. Orr v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-93-1487 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 1994).
166. Id. at 9-12.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 12.
170. Hadley v. VAM P.T.S., 44 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 1995).
171. Id at 375.
172. 846 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. 1993).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted) (argued Mar. 8, 1994).
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tests to determine whether the tests indicated poppy seed consumption
rather than illegal drug use, and negligent in their failure to retain and
return her urine sample properly. Doe also alleged that Quaker Oats
breached the employment contract by failing to provide her with a rea-
sonable opportunity to pass the drug test and that Quaker Oats was negli-
gent. In addition, Doe alleged that SmithKline tortiously interfered with
her contract with Quaker Oats.176 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to Quaker Oats and SmithKline, and Doe appealed.
With respect to Doe's negligence claims, the court of appeals reversed
the summary judgment as to SmithKline. 177 The court held that
SmithKline owed a duty to Doe because it created a possibility of misin-
terpretation of test results by making representations that implied the in-
fallibility of its tests and by failing to provide any information regarding
the possible implications of the raw test results. 178 Furthermore, the
court found that SmithKline owed a duty to Doe because SmithKline de-
stroyed Doe's urine sample contrary to Doe's instructions. 179 Construing
all disputed facts and inferences in favor of Doe, the court concluded that
Doe established the proximate cause element of its negligence claims
against SmithKline by showing that but for SmithKline's failure to pro-
vide some safeguards or additional information, Doe would not have con-
sumed poppy seeds and would not have failed her drug test, and that but
for Doe's positive test result, Quaker Oats would not have revoked the
job offer.180 The court was not persuaded that SmithKline should be ab-
solved of liability based on an Illinois law prohibiting SmithKline from
interpreting the raw test results, concluding that SmithKline was obli-
gated to provide sufficient information regarding possible test anomalies
to prevent the misleading perception that a positive drug test exclusively
indicates illegal drug use.181
The court of appeals also reversed the trial court's summary judgment
as to Doe's claim that SmithKline tortiously interfered with her contract
with Quaker Oats, explaining that a prospective contract for employ-
ment-at-will can give rise to a tortious interference claim.182 More impor-
tantly, however, SmithKline apparently raised no grounds specifically
attacking Doe's tortious interference with contract claim.' 83
With respect to Doe's breach of contract claim against Quaker Oats,
the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment. 184 The court ex-
plained that because Doe was employed at-will, Quaker Oats would have
been able to terminate her without breaching the contract if Doe had
176. Id. at 252. Doe also sought damages against SmithKline and Quaker Oats for
defamation. See infra at notes 222-31.
177. IL at 256.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 855 S.W.2d at 256.
181. Id. at 256-57.
182. Id. at 258.
183. Id
184. Id. 855 S.W.2d at 254.
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failed a drug test for any reason after starting her job. 185 The court saw
no reason to place greater contractual duties on Quaker Oats in a pre-
employment situation. 186 The court of appeals also affirmed the trial
court's summary judgment as to Doe's negligence claim against Quaker
Oats. 187 The court rejected Doe's claim that Quaker Oats owed to Doe
"a tort duty in addition to its obligations under the contract.' 88 The
court observed that in determining the nature of Doe's claim, the court
looked to the nature of the loss or damage and the independence of the
alleged tortious conduct from the contract. 89 Because Doe's alleged loss
is her expected earnings as a Quaker Oats employee, Doe's claim sounds
in contract only. 190 Therefore, Quaker Oats owed no tort duty to Doe.191
The court also addressed the argument raised by Quaker Oats and
SmithKline that they were protected from liability by the release, waiver
and indemnity provisions of a consent form signed by Doe. 192 Because
the court determined that Quaker Oats was not liable as a matter of law
on each of Doe's causes of action, the court declined to determine
whether the release was enforceable as to Quaker Oats.193 The court de-
termined, however, that the release was unenforceable to shield
SmithKline from liability from Doe's negligence and tortious interference
with contract claims. 194 The court noted that the release may well be void
as a matter of public policy based on the disparity of bargaining power in
the parties' relationship. 195 The court concluded, however, that even if
the release were not void on the basis of public policy, the release was not
an effective release of liability because it did not satisfy the requirements
of the express-negligence doctrine. 96 Under the express-negligence doc-
trine, which had previously been applied only to indemnity agreements
and not to releases, the agreement must expressly state that it applies to
negligence to be effective as a release of such liability. 197 Because the
waiver signed by Doe did not expressly release liability for negligence, it
did not constitute an effective release of SmithKline from liability for
negligence. 198 Finally, the court noted that SmithKline was not protected
by the terms of the waiver because SmithKline was neither expressly
185. Id. at 254.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 257-58.
188. Id. at 257 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 157, 204
S.W.2d 508, 510 (1947)).
189. Id. (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1992, writ denied)); W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton &
David C. Owen, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 92 at 656-58 (5th ed. 1984)).
190. SmithKline, 855 S.W.2d at 57.
191. Id.
192. Id at 253-54.
193. Id at 254.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 855 S.W.2d at 253 (citing Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 708
(Tex. 1987)).
197. Id.
198. Id at 254.
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named in the waiver nor an agent of Quaker Oats, but appeared to be an
independent contractor. 199
The Texas Supreme Court granted SmithKline's application for writ of
error on the points that (1) the court of appeals erred in creating a duty
on the part of drug testing companies to warn employers and test subjects
about possible causes of positive drug screens; (2) the court of appeals
erred in finding that SmithKline did not negate the element of proximate
cause because Doe's lie was the proximate cause of her non-hiring; (3)
the court erred in reversing the summary judgment on the issue of tor-
tious interference because SmithKline owed no duty to inform Quaker
Oats of the potential effect of poppy seeds on a drug test; and (4) the.
court erred in holding that the release did not apply to SmithKline.2°°
In Reeves v. Western Co. of North America201 James Reeves sued the
Western Company of North America (WCNA) for negligence and gross
negligence arising out of a drug and alcohol test that was a condition of
employment with WCNA. Reeves, who applied for a sales position with
WCNA, agreed to the test and signed a "consent to toxicology tests"
form. After taking the test, the test results came back and were positive
for alcohol. WCNA told Reeves that the alcohol content was 0.4%, when
in fact the figure was 0.04%. Reeves denied having had any alcohol and
asked the company to investigate further. A second confirmatory test
was performed and it again showed positive alcohol results, although it
indicated that the alcohol content might be caused by an alternative
source (microbial breakdown of sugar). Reeves was not informed of the
second letter. Reeves contended that WCNA was negligent in the man-
ner in which is secured, tested and/or reported the test results of the urine
sample, that WCNA's negligence was the proximate cause of his dam-
ages, and that WCNA was grossly negligent. Reeves claimed that a duty
existed under "general common law concepts and sound public policy" to
fully and non-negligently report the test results to him. 20 2 Reeves also
contended that even if no duty existed from the outset, WCNA owed a
duty when it requested a second screening which disclosed a possible al-
ternative basis for the alcohol content.203 Reeves argued that the legal
duty was owed to him only as a job applicant and not as an employee-at-
will.2°4 The jury rendered a verdict for Reeves, but the trial court granted
WCNA's motion for judgment n.o.v. and entered judgment for WCNA.
The court of appeals affirmed.
199. Id.
200. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 440, 440-41 (Feb. 2,
1994)(argued Mar. 8, 1994).
201. 867 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested).
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The court addressed the threshold issue of whether WCNA owed a
legal duty to Reeves.205 Initially, the court observed that Reeves con-
ceded "that no cause of action has been recognized in Texas imposing a
legal duty on a prospective employer to report drug and alcohol tests
results to a job applicant. '' 2°6 The court observed that there was no evi-
dence that WCNA conducted the screening tests which resulted in the
positive alcohol results.207 The court noted that the negligence, if any, in
conducting the screening test would be that of the laboratory, but Reeves
did not challenge the testing procedures of the lab that evaluated his
test.20 8 The court stated that WCNA, a prospective employer, owed no
duty to Reeves to report to him the results of the drug and alcohol
screening test.2°9 The court also held that WCNA owed no duty to report
to Reeves the results of the second screening test.210 The court con-
cluded that "recovery for negligence is precluded by the legal principle
that no duty is owed by a prospective employer to a job applicant to dis-
close results of screening tests for drug or alcohol, i.e., no cause of action
arises." 211
6. Defamation
Defamation under Texas law is "a defamatory statement orally commu-
nicated or published to a third person without legal excuse. '212 Under
Texas law, the court must make the threshold determination of whether
the complained of statement or publication 213 is capable of conveying a
defamatory meaning.214 In making this determination, the court con-
strues the statement as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances,
considering how a person of ordinary intelligence would understand the
205. 867 S.W.2d at 389 (citing Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523,
525 (Tex. 1990)).
206. Id. at 390.
207. Id
208. Id.
209. Id. at 391.
210. 867 S.W.2d at 391.
211. Id.
212. Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423,428 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas
law) (quoting Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986,
no writ)). Libel is defined in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE AN. § 73.001 (Vernon 1986),
as a statement:
that tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living
person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, in-
tegrity, virtue, or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and
thereby expose the person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.
213. Marshall Field Stores, Inc. v. Gardiner, 859 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (where the circumstantial evidence could lead to two
conclusions: one, that the employer published the information to the employees, or two,
that the employees learned the information from gossip resulting from the events sur-
rounding the termination, the court held that the circumstantial evidence did not support
the jury's verdict of defamation because both conclusions were equally likely).
214. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567,569 (Tex. 1989) (citing Musser v. Smith Protective
Serv. Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653,654-55 (Tex. 1987)); Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton S.A., 766
S.W.2d 377, 381 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
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statement.215 Only when the court determines the language is ambiguous
or of doubtful import should a jury determine the statement's meaning
and the effect of the statement on an ordinary reader.216 The courts have
also held that a former employer's refusal to discuss with a prospective
employer the reasons or circumstances surrounding an employee's termi-
nation does not constitute defamation. 217 Of course, if the communica-
tion is true, that is an absolute defense to the defamation claim. 218
a. The Doctrine of Self-Publication
Generally, in the employment context, publication of defamation oc-
curs when an employer communicates to a third party a defamatory state-
ment about a former employee. The doctrine of self-publication provides
that publication also occurs when an individual is compelled to publish
215. See Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle
Publishing Co., 149 Tex. 87, 96, 228 S.W.2d 499, 504 (1950). See McKethan v. Texas Farm
Bureau, 996 F.2d 734, 743 (5th Cir. 1993) (evidence showed that there had been teasing
and laughter at the convention, and that the context of a jovial recognition ceremony, the
nature of the remarks, and the employee's prominence as an exceptional district sales man-
ager; therefore, the court concluded that a person of ordinary intelligence would not attri-
bute a defamatory meaning to the "cutting comments"); Crum, 946 F.2d at 429
(announcement to staff that employee on leave pending results of an investigation by an
industrial psychologist/management consultant, whose job was to examine the organization
at the airline's magazine, cannot be construed as an allegation of mental disturbance).
216. See Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Denton Publishing Co. v.
Boyd, 460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970). Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 618-
19 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009(1985) illustrates how a statement that may not appear defamatory may be construed as
defamatory by a jury. In Buck, a prospective new employer of Buck telephoned Hall &
Co. to learn about the circumstances surrounding Buck's termination. One of Hall & Co.'s
employees stated that Buck hadn't reached his production goals. When pressed for more
information, the employee declined to comment. The prospective employer then asked if
the company would rehire Buck, and the employee answered no. The prospective em-
ployer testified that because of the company's employee's comments, he was unwilling to
extend an offer of employment. Buck sued his former employer for defamation of charac-
ter alleging that Hall & Co. employees made defamatory statements about him during the
course of telephone conversations with Buck's prospective employers. The jury found in
favor of Buck. The company appealed the jury determination that the alleged statements
were defamatory and argued that the words were susceptible to a nondefamatory interpre-
tation because Buck was never explicitly accused of any wrongdoing nor was he called
anything disparaging. The court disagreed and concluded that there was evidence suffi-
cient to show that the prospective employer understood the statements made by the de-
fendant's employee in a defamatory sense. Because the statements were ambiguous, the
court held that the jury was entitled to find that the company's statements were calculated
to convey that Buck had been terminated because of serious misconduct. Id. at 619.
217. Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1994 WL 575520(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], writ denied) (former supervisors held not to have a duty
to talk to prospective employer); American Medical Int'l Inc. v. Giurintano, 821 S.W.2d
331, 337 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (former employer has no duty to
talk to anyone about a former employee); see Geise v. The Neiman Marcus Group, Inc.,
No. H-92-2703, slip op. at 5-6 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1993) (an employer's "gag order" imposed
on employees to prevent discussing reasons for another employee's termination is not
defamatory).
218. Randall's Food Mkts. Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995); Washington v.
Naylor Indus. Servs., Inc., 01-94-00244-CV, 1995 WL 70719, *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.], Feb. 23, 1995, n.w.h.) (communication of results of drug test to employee's supervi-
sors was a truthful communication, therefore, it was not actionable).
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defamatory statements in response to inquiries of prospective employers,
and the former employer should have foreseen that compulsion.219 Un-
like other jurisdictions, Texas does not analyze the circumstances in terms
of whether the facts compelled the former employee to repeat the defam-
atory words;220 focusing instead on the foreseeability that the words be
communicated to a third party.221
Recently, in Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,222 the Quaker Oats
Company (Quaker Oats) offered Jane Doe a job as a marketing assistant
conditioned upon Doe satisfactorily passing a drug-screening examina-
tion (which Doe consented to). The only medication Doe listed on the
questionnaire was her prescribed birth control pills. After taking the
drug test, SmithKline Beecham Corporation (SmithKline) forwarded the
219. See Howard J. Seigel, Self-Publication: Defamation Within the Employment Con-
text, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1994) (reviewing the rules and reasoning of various jurisdictions
that permit defamation actions supported by self-publication); Diane H. Mazur, Note, Self-
Publication of Defamation and Employee Discharge, 6 REv. Lmo. 313, 314 (1987). TWo
cases in Texas recognize the doctrine of self-publication. See Chasewood Constr. Co. v.
Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it
was reasonable to expect that contractor dismissed from project for theft would be re-
quired to repeat reason to others); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it was reasonable to expect that
former bank employee discharged for dishonesty would be required to admit in employ-
ment interview or in application for employment about same). See Purcell v. Seguin State
Bank and Trust Company, 999 F.2d 950, 959 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Chasewood and Ake
court observed that Texas courts recognize the narrow exception of self-compelled defama-
tion). See also Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 881 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (court recognized Ake but declined to ad-
dress issue because case reversed on other grounds); Reeves v. Western Co. of N. Am., 867
S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested) (observing that the self-
defamation doctrine has not been recognized by all the Texas courts).
220. See McKinney v. Santa Clara County, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980);
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Colo. 1988); Belcher v. Little, 315
N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876,
895 (Minn. 1986) (the following must be proven for a finding that a statement is self-com-
pelled: (1) a strong compulsion to disclose the defamatory statement to third parties exists;
(2) the existence of the strong compulsion was reasonably foreseeable to the wrongdoer;
and (3) such disclosure was actually made).
221. Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 445-46; Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701. The Texas courts' rec-
ognition of the doctrine of self-publication is based upon comment k of the RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977). Comment k provides:
k. Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defama-
tory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it
to a third person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so
communicated ....
It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be
intentional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an
unreasonable risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a
third person, the conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent
communication amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional
communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977). See Reeves v. Western Co. of
North America, 867 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ requested) (em-
ployee's speculation about possible consequences if prospective employers learned that he
failed the alcohol test did not support his defamation claim).
222. 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted) (argued Mar. 8, 1994).
SMU LAW REVIEW
results to Quaker Oats. The results showed that Doe's sample tested pos-
itive for the presence of opiates. Quaker Oats then rescinded Doe's offer
of employment. Doe offered as an explanation that she had taken one of
her roommates prescription painkillers - an explanation she later re-
canted.2 23 Doe then asserted that the reason for the positive drug test
was the result of her consumption of several poppy seed muffins in the
days before her drug test. It was undisputed that scientific literature on
drug testing reported that ordinary poppy seed consumption could pro-
duce positive test results for opiates. Doe reapplied for the job, but was
turned down for misrepresenting that she had taken someone else's pre-
scription medication. Among other things, Doe sued Quaker Oats and
SmithKline for defamation alleging that she was compelled to disclose
her failure of the drug test to other prospective employers. The trial
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and Doe
appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed. The court observed that the Texas
Supreme Court has not adopted the doctrine of self-defamation.2 2 4 The
court held that the rule remains that "if the publication of which Orr
complains was consented to, authorized, invited or procured by Orr, he
cannot recover for injuries sustained by reason of the publication. 12 25
The court rejected Doe's reliance on Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico 226
and First State Bank v. Ake22 7 which rely on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 577 comment m:
One who communicates defamatory matter directly to the defamed
person, who himself communicates it to a third party, has not pub-
lished the matter to third party if there are no other circumstances.
If the defamed person's transmission of the communication to the
third person was made, however, without an awareness of the defama-
tory nature of the matter and if the circumstances indicated that com-
munication to a third party is likely, however, a publication may
properly be held to have occurred.2 28
The court noted that the Chasewood and Ake opinions omit the empha-
sized portion of the RESTATEMENT which is essential because "it consti-
tutes the first hurdle of a two-part test for self-defamation: (1) the
defamed person was unaware of the defamatory nature of the matter; and
(2) the circumstances indicated that the communication to the third party
would be likely.122 9 The court observed that Doe immediately knew of
the defamatory implications of the statement; therefore, the court held
223. Id. at 251. Doe accounted for the lie regarding the painkillers as made " 'under
extreme duress' and when she was 'completely, essentially out of [her] mind'." Id
224. Id. at 259.
225. Id. (quoting Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 94, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945)).
226. 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
227. 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
228. Doe, 855 S.W.2d at 259 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. m
(1977) (emphasis added)).
229. Id. (quoting Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 449).
1168 [Vol. 48
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
that Doe failed to satisfy the first part of the two-part test.230 Further-
more, the court reasoned that Doe did not meet the first requirement of a
self-defamation claim, that the defamed person was unaware of the de-
famatory nature of the matter.2 31
In Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc.232 Jeffrey Duffy sued his former
employer, Leading Edge Products (Leading Edge), alleging that he was
compelled to republish to prospective employers the reason for his termi-
nation - that he sexually harassed two co-workers. 233 The district court
granted Leading Edge's motion for summary judgment and the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit first determined that Leading Edge had a
qualified privilege to make the communication that Duffy was terminated
for sexual harassment. 234 To recover, then, Duffy was required to show
that Leading Edge made the communication with actual malice (i.e., that
the statement was made with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to its truth).235 The court rejected Duffy's ar-
gument that actual malice should not be required in employment cases,
but only when the First Amendment is implicated. The Fifth Circuit
noted that Texas does not support that argument.236 The court concluded
that Duffy did not meet his burden of presenting evidence of actual mal-
ice, and the evidence showed that Leading Edge acted reasonably and
carefully in determining the veracity of the sexual harassment claims
against Duffy.
b. Absolute Privilege
Any communication, oral or written, which is uttered or published in
the course of or in contemplation of a judicial proceeding is absolutely
privileged.237 No action for damages will lie for such communication
even though it is false and published with malice. 238 The privilege has
also been extended to proceedings before executive officers, boards, and
commissions exercising quasi-judicial powers239 and to governmental em-
ployees exercising discretionary functions.240 Examples of quasi-judicial
bodies include the State Bar Grievance Committee, a grand jury, the
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995).
233. Id. at 318 n.5. The Fifth Circuit observed that the question of whether Texas rec-
ognizes the self-publication doctrine is an open question. Id. (comparing Chasewood Con-
str. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); First
State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) with Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248,259 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1993, writ granted)).
234. Id. at 312. Duffy did not dispute Leading Edge had a qualified privilege.
235. Duffy, 44 F.3d at 313.
236. Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1970)).
237. James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982).
238. Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 109, 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942).
239. Id. at 912; Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 881 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.).




Railroad Commission, the Pharmacy Board, the Internal Affairs Division
of the Police Department of Dallas,241 and the Texas Employment
Commission.242
A communication by an employer about a former employee may also
be absolutely privileged if the employee authorized the communica-
tion.243 When a plaintiff consents to a publication, the defendant is abso-
lutely privileged to make it even if it proves to be defamatory.244 Texas
follows the general rule that if a plaintiff complains about a publication
which he, "consented to, authorized, invited or procured, by the plaintiff,
he cannot recover for injuries sustained as a result of the publication. ' 245
In other words, the consent privilege applies when a plaintiff gives refer-
ences for a prospective employer to contact and the former employer
makes defamatory statements.246 While there is some uncertainty
whether consent creates an absolute privilege or simply makes the defa-
mation not actionable, the distinction is irrelevant because the result is
the same.247
In Hooper v. Pitney Bowes248 Elaine Hooper sued Pitney Bowes, her
former employer, claiming defamation. The lawsuit arose after Hooper
conducted sales meetings during which she encouraged sales staff to en-
gage in mind-altering exercises, experience emotional breakthroughs, and
release inner energies in an effort to become better sales people. Several
staff members complained of the "cult-like" techniques and two Pitney
Bowes supervisors, Gary Simpson and Robert Moretti, began an investi-
gation. They eventually concluded that Hooper's conduct was inappro-
priate. Simpson and Moretti described Hooper as a witch and as satanic.
After a jury trial the jury found that Pitney Bowes slandered Hooper, but
that Hooper consented to the slander. The court of appeals affirmed. 249
241. Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
242. Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 303 (S.D. Tex. 1990);
Hardwick, 881 S.W.2d at 198; Krenek v. Abel, 594 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1980, no writ).
243. Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433,436 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
244. Id. at 436 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977)).
245. Id. at 437 (citing Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945)). See
Jones v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 979 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law
the court held that plaintiff waived state law libel claim based on a defendant's publication
of a memorandum to the school district where plaintiff released the defendants from liabil-
ity for information they provided to the district).
246. Id. (citing 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.17 at 138-
39 (2d ed. 1986)).
247. Id. at 437-38. The court noted that the RESTATEMENT and other treatises conclude
that consent creates an absolute privilege. Id. at 437 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 583; PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 114; F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0. GRAY,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.17). The Texas cases seem to suggest that consent simply makes
the defamation not actionable. Id. at 438 (citing Lyle, 188 S.W.2d at 772; Duncantell v.
Universal Life Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mayfield v. Gleichert, 437 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969,
no writ); Wilks v. DeBolt, 211 S.W.2d 589,590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1948, no writ)).
248. Hooper v. Pitney Bowes, No. 06-94-00034-CV, 1995 WL 37313 (Tex. App.-Tex-
arkana, Jan. 31, 1995, n.w.h.).
249. Id. at *4.
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The court noted evidence that Hooper admitted that her actions could
reasonably be considered cultish and that she asked her supervisors to
invesitage her activities so that the allegation of "cultism" could be
cleared up. Hooper also admitted that she orchestrated some of the ac-
tivity, at least in part, in an attempt to have one of her supervisors fired.
Considering this evidence, the court of appeals stated that there was suffi-
cient support for the jury's finding that Hooper consented to the
slander.250
c. An Employer's Qualified Privilege
An employer will not be liable if the statement is published under cir-
cumstances that make it conditionally privileged and if the privilege is not
abused.251 "Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of law."'252
"A qualified privilege comprehends communication made in good faith
on subject matter in which the author has an interest or with reference to
which he has an interest or with reference to which he has a duty to per-
form to another person having a corresponding interest or duty. '253 Gen-
erally, defamatory statements by an employer about an employee, or
former employee, to a person having a common interest in the matter to
which the communication relates, such as a prospective employer, are
qualifiedly privileged. 254
An employer may lose the qualified privilege if his communication or
publication is accompanied by actual malice.255 In defamation cases, ac-
250. Id
251. Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 4 F.3d 989, slip op. at 2673 (5th Cir.
1993) (not for publication); Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 1990); Gaines v.
CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Bergman v. Oshman's
Sporting Goods, Inc., 594 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-'Tler 1980, no writ); Butler v.
Central Bank & Rust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ
dism'd w.o.j.)); Houston v. Grocers Supply Co., 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 936).
252. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (interpreting Texas law); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800
(citing Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816; Mayfield v. Gleichart, 484 S.W.2d
619, 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-lyler 1972, no writ)).
253. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (quoting Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800); Randall's Food
Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 654 (Tex. 1995); Washington v. Naylor Indus.
Servs., Inc., 01-94-00244-CV, 1995 WL 70719, *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 23,
1995, n.w.h.); see Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ
denied); Pioneer Concrete, Inc. v. Allen, 858 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (quoting Kaplan v. Goodfried, 497 S.W.2d 101, 105 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1973, no writ); Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937; 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES, & 0.
GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.26 at 228 (2d ed. 1986)).
254. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 654 (citing Butler v. Central Bank & Tust Co., 458
S.W.2d 510,514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-1970, writ dism'd)); Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711
S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (citing Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at
800; Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816); Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937.
255. Randalls, 891 S.W.2d at 654; Dixon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d 240,
242 (Tex. 1980); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1970); Mara-
thon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682 S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 801; Bridges v. Farmer, 483 S.W.2d 939, 944
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ). See Danawala v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 4
F.3d 989, slip op. 2673 (5th Cir. 1993) (not for publication) (unauthorized gossip spread by
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tual malice is separate and distinct from traditional common law mal-
ice.2 5 6 Actual malice does not include ill will, spite or evil motive; rather,
it requires "the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false, or
with reckless disregard of whether it is true. '2 57 Further, " '[r]eckless dis-
regard' is defined as a high degree of awareness of probable falsity, for
proof of which a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication'. 2 58 An error in judgment is not sufficient to
show actual malice.2 59
While the Texas cases adopting the doctrine of self-publication do not
address the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists in self-defamation
actions,2 6° decisions in other jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine of
self-publication have recognized a qualified privilege in the employment
context.261 A federal district court in Texas has recognized that such a
privilege may exist in self-defamation actions; however, the court ren-
dered judgment on other grounds. 262
In Johnson v. Randall's Food Mkts. 263 Mary Lynn Johnson was termi-
nated from Randall's after she allegedly stole a Christmas wreath from
unidentified co-workers does not take the defendants outside the scope of the qualified
privilege).
256. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989); Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567,
571 (Tex. 1989).
257. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 654 (citing Hagler v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 884
S.W.2d 771, 771-72 (Tex. 1994)); Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328 (1974)); Casso, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989).
258. Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Casso, 776 S.W.2d
at 558). The plaintiff's evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment must
amount to more than a conclusion to create a fact issue. Martin v. Southwestern Elec.
Power Co., 860 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied) (the plaintiff's
response that "I know that most of the assertions made in the letter about me are not true
and, therefore: the letter must have been written based on malice directed at me," held
insufficient to create I fact issue); Schauer v. Memorial Care Sys., 856 S.W.2d 437, 450
(Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (court held that the plaintiff failed to
present clear, positive and direct evidence of malice to create a fact issue).
259. Id.
260. See supra notes 212-36.
261. See, e.g., Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (D.
Minn. 1989) (Minnesota law recognizes a qualified privilege in the employer/employee re-
lationship if the statements were made in good faith); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759
P.2d 1336, 1347 (Colo. 1988) (qualified privilege recognized in the employer-employee
context); Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (recognizing exist-
ence of a qualified privilege); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876
(Minn. 1986). In Lewis, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly acknowledged the reason
for allowing the qualified privilege in self-publication cases:
Where an employer would be entitled to a privilege if it had actually pub-
lished the statement, it makes little sense to deny the privilege where the
identical communication is made to identical third parties with the only dif-
ference being the mode of publication. Finally, recognition of a qualified
privilege seems to be the only effective means of addressing the concern that
every time an employer states the reason for discharging an employee it will
subject itself to potential liability for defamation.
Id. at 889-90.
262. Young v. Dow Chem. Co., No. H-90-1145, 1991 WL 138322, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr.
5, 1991).
263. 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995).
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her employer. Johnson sued Randall's claiming slander. Johnson's su-
pervisors allegedly communicated this information to other Randall's em-
ployees. Randall's presented evidence that showed that they considered
Johnson's motive for removing the wreath an open question. Johnson,
however, presented evidence that Randall's personnel believed that she
stole the wreath and published the incident as a theft. The trial court
granted summary judgment for Randall's, the court of appeals re-
versed, 264 and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's sum-
mary judgment.265 First, the supreme court held that the statements that
Johnson left the store without paying for the wreath were true, and an
absolute defense to slander claim.266 The court rejected Johnson's argu-
ment that those who hear the statements might infer that she is dishonest.
The court observed that Randall's had a right to investigate the incident
and could not have conducted an investigation without communicating
the facts regarding Johnson's actions to one another.267 Second, the court
held that the statements were protected by a qualified privilege.268 The
court held that all of the employees who either gave or received state-
ments about the wreath incident had an interest or duty in the matter,
and Randall's established that its employees had reasonable grounds to
believe that their statements were true.269 Finally, the court held Ran-
dall's was not liable for a cosmetician's circulation to employees and cus-
tomers of a petition about Johnson's poor management skills and use of
store merchandise without paying for it.270 The court concluded that the
cosmetician acted independently and outside the scope of her authority
and that Randall's did not authorize, condone, or ratify her circulation of
the petition.271
In Hardwick v. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (HL&P)2 7 2 Raymond
Hardwick, a long-time employee of HL&P, was operations foreman at an
HL&P plant at the time of his discharge. While Hardwick was foreman,
an accident occurred resulting in saltwater entering the boiler system at a
turbine in the plant. The unit was severely damaged because it was not
discovered for approximately twenty hours. Harwich sued* HL&P be-
cause he claimed that HL&P employees published statements that he was
fired because HL&P considered him responsible for failing to detect the
saltwater in the boiler system. The trial court granted HL&P's motion for
summary judgment. Hardwick appealed, and the court of appeals re-
versed. Hardwick claimed that the alleged defnatory statment was that
he was discharged because he allowed saltwater to get into the boilers
264. 869 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993), rev'd, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.
1995).
265. 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995).




270. 891 S.W.2d at 656.
271. Id.
272. 881 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
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with resulting damage to the turbine. Hardwick argued that the state-
ment implied that he was incompetent because he did not immediately
detect the problem and he countered that the real problem was caused by
HL&P's failure to properly maintain the turbine. Because the statement
could be considered defamatory,273 the court held that the ambiguity cre-
ated a question of fact precluding summary judgment.274 The court also
rejected HL&P's claim of qualified privilege because HL&P's summary
judgment evidence did not establish the scope of the publication of the
statement within its own organization. 275 The court observed that HL&P
has a qualified privilege to communicate personnel information within its
organization, but the privilege does not permit unlimited disclosure of the
information.276
In Oliver v. BancTexas277 Susan Oliver was terminated for violating
Banc-Texas' attendance policy. Oliver sued her former employer for def-
amation because it communicated to BancTexas personnel clerks that Ol-
iver violated BancTexas' absentee policy. The federal district court
dismissed Oliver's defamation claim because the statements were not
false.278 Additionally, even if the statements were false, the statements
were protected because they were communicated in good faith.279 More-
over, the statements concerned issues in which BancTexas had a legiti-
mate interest.280 Therefore, the court held that the statements were
privileged.281
7. Invasion of Privacy
In 1973, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the right of privacy 282 by
stating that "an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy constitutes a
legal injury for which a remedy will be granted. ' 283 Subsequently, the
273. The court observed that a statement is "defamatory" if it tends to harm the reputa-
tion of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third per-
sons from associating or dealing with him, or if it tends to expose him to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule. Id. at 197 (citing 53 C.J.S. LIBEL AND SLANDER § 2 (1987)).
274. Id. at 198.
275. Id. at 199.
276. Id.
277. Oliver v. BancTexas, No. H-93-0698 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 1994).




282. In 1973, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the right of privacy in Billings v.
Atkinson, 484 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973). In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
propounded a concept of a right of privacy which they asserted justified an independent
tort remedy. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
P~v. 193, 193-98 (1890) [hereinafter Warren & Brandeis]. The Warren and Brandeis arti-
cle resulted from a Boston newspaper's regular practice of elaborating on the Warrens'
social life. Bruce A. McKenna, Comment, False Light: Invasion of Privacy?, 15 TULSA
L.J. 113, 114 (1979). As McKenna observed, Warren's concern with the publication of this
gossip and his discussions with Brandeis led to the birth of the law of privacy. The overrid-
ing concern of the Warren and Brandeis article was how to deal with excesses by the press.
Warren & Brandeis, supra, at 195-96.
283. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973).
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supreme court recognized four categories of invasion of privacy identified
by Dean Prosser: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of an-
other; (2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable
publicity given to another's private life; and (4) publicity that unreasona-
bly places another in a false light before the public.284 In Diamond
Shamrock Ref. and Mktg. Co. v. Mendez285 the Texas Supreme Court left
open the question whether it would recognize the fourth category of inva-
sion of privacy: the false light theory of invasion of privacy.286 Last year,
in Cain v. Hearst Corp.287 the Texas Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held
that Texas does not recognize the false light theory of invasion of pri-
vacy.288 Clyde Cain, a prison inmate serving a life sentence for murder,
sued the Houston Chronicle because an article in the newspaper referred
to him as a burglar, thief, pimp and killer. Cain complained that the
newspaper invaded his privacy by placing him in a false light because the
article referred to him as a member of the "Dixie Mafia" and that he had
killed as many as eight people. Cain sued in state court and the newspa-
per removed the case to federal court. The federal district court dimissed
Cain's complaint on the basis that Cain's action was in libel and the one-
year statute of limitations barred his claim. On appeal the Fifth Circuit
284. Industrial Found. of the South v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682
(Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF.
L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser]; William L. Prosser, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 117 at 809 (4th ed. 1971)). Interestingly, Dean Prosser was skeptical about the desirabil-
ity of the false light privacy action because of its potential confusion with defamation. See
William L. Prosser, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 813-14; Prosser, supra at 400-01. Never-
theless, Prosser's analysis of the four categories of invasion of privacy was subsequently
adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).
285. 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992).
286. Id. at 200. The RESTATEMENT provides the following definition of publicity plac-
ing a person in a false light:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be
placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see also Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 10.02[1] at 10-7 (1989). The Texas courts of appeals have followed the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS when reviewing the false light theory of invasion of
privacy. Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1990, writ denied); Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345,346-47 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1982, no writ); see Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1987) (inter-
preting Texas law).
287. 878 S.W.2d.577 (Tex. 1994); see Shaheen v. Motion Indus., Inc., 880 S.W.2d 88, 92
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (noting that Texas Supreme Court has not
recognized cause of action for false light invasion of privacy).
288. The Fifth Circuit certified the issue to the supreme court in Cain v. Hearst Corp., 1
F.3d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1993). The Texas Supreme Court agreed to answer the question,
Cain v. Hearst Corp., 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 510 (Feb 9, 1994), and rejected the cause of action.
Cain v. Hearst, 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994), thereby answers the issue reserved in Mendez,
844 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1992).
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certified the question to the Texas Supreme Court: whether Texas recog-
nizes the false light theory of invasion of privacy. The supreme court
rejected the cause of action for two reasons: first, it largely duplicates
other theories of recovery, particularly defamation; and second, it does
not have many of the procedural limitations that accompany defamation
claims, thereby unacceptably increasing the tension that already exists be-
tween tort law and the constitutional right of free speech.289
8. Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although individuals continue to urge the courts to adopt an implied
contractual covenant or a tortious duty of good faith and fair dealing in
the employer-employee relationship, the Texas Supreme Court290 and the
courts of appeals291 have refused to recognize such an obligation. It ap-
289. 878 S.W.2d at 579-80.
290. See Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d 282, 284 n.1 (Tex. 1993)
(per curiam) (noting that supreme court has declined to recognize a general duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the employer-employee relationship); McClendon v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991), aff'g 757 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1988, writ granted); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d
723, 724 n.2 (Tex. 1990); see also Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462 (5th Cir.
1991) (Texas courts do not recognize covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employ-
ment relationship); Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 948-49 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas
courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship);
Bates v. Humana, Inc., No. SA-92-CA-432, 1993 WL 556416 at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 12,
1993); Haynes v. Henry S. Miller Management Corp., No. CA3-88-2556-T (N.D. Tex. Dec.
5, 1990) (Texas Supreme Court has not recognized implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing); Rayburn v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 805 F. Supp. 1401, 1409 (S.D. Tex.
1992) (Texas courts do not recognize either contractual implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing or tort duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship); Guz-
man v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp. 994, 1000-01 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (Texas courts
do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship); Nicholls
v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990) (Texas courts do not
recognize claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employ-
ment contract); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 276-77 (W.D. Tex.
1989) (no duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship); Bowser v. Mc-
Donald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (Texas courts do not recognize duty
of good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship).
291. See Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., No. 01-92-00134-CV, 1994 WL
575520, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.], writ denied) (not designated for publica-
tion); Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ
denied); Cole v. Hall, 864 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (en
banc) (rejecting claim for duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relation-
ship); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 260 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993,
writ granted) (holding that an employer does not owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing
to an employee); Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1993, writ
denied) (recognizing that supreme court expressly rejected an invitation to recognize the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment area); Day & Zimmer-
man, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied) (no
cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment context);
Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. 1993); (rejecting claim for
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, court recognized that current mood of a
majority supreme court is to adhere to at-will rule); Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307,
312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (neither the legislature nor the
supreme court have recognized an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment relationship); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 303-04
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pears that the Texas Supreme Court laid the issue to rest in McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co.292 On remand from the United States Supreme
Court,2 93 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' deci-
sion that there is not an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
the employment relationship. 294 The McClendon court of appeals specifi-
cally declined to extend the Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins,
Co. 295 duty of good faith and fair dealing to the employment relation-
ship.296 It held that the special relationship between insurers and in-
sureds is not equally applicable to employers and employees, and that to
extend it to the employment relationship would be tantamount to impos-
ing such a duty on all commercial relationships. 297 Imposing the duty on
the employment relationship would also violate the supreme court's dis-
approval of restrictions on free movement of employees in the work-
place.298 Finally, the volumes of legislation restricting an employer's right
to discharge an employee compels the conclusion that such a dramatic
change in policy affecting the employer-employee relationship and the
employment at-will doctrine should be left to the legislature.299
9. False Imprisonment
In Randall's Food Mkts. v. Johnson300 Mary Lynn Johnson, a manager
of a Randall's grocery store, left the store without paying for a Christmas
wreath. Two days later, Johnson was interviewed by Mike Seals, the dis-
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (supreme court expressly rejected an invitation to
recognize an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relation-
ship); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (court rejected implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in the employment relationship).
In Lumpkin the sole point of error on appeal to the court of appeals was whether an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in the employer-employee rela-
tionship. Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 539. The court of appeals overruled Lumpkin's point of
error, and Lumpkin appealed the issue to the supreme court. Lumpkin v. H & C Commu-
nications, Inc., 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13 (Oct. 16, 1988). Lumpkin's application for a writ of
error had been pending before the supreme court for approximately one year when the
court decided McClendon, infra, note 292. Curiously, the supreme court did not grant
Lumpkin's application when it granted McClendon's application to consolidate the cases.
Nevertheless, shortly after McClendon, the court denied Lumpkin's application for a writ
of error. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 114 (Dec. 6, 1989).
292. 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), aff'd on remand, 807
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991).
293. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
294. McClendon, 807 S.W.2d at 577.
295. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987) (duty of good faith and fair dealing extended to insur-
ers and insureds).
296. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 819-20.
297. Id. at 819.
298. Id. at 820 (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987); Hill v.
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987)).
299. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 820 (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; Watson v. Zep Mfg.
Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
300. 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995).
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trict manager, and by Lewis Simmons, the store director, concerning the
incident. During the interview, Johnson claimed that she had so much on
her mind that she forgot to pay for the wreath. As a result of the inci-
dent, Johnson brought suit against Randall's, Seals, Simmons, and other
Randall's employees alleging, among other things, false imprisonment.30 1
In support of her claim for false imprisonment, Johnson claimed that
prior to the interview with Simmons and Seals, Simmons ordered Johnson
to wait in a back room for two to three hours for Seals to arrive. Johnson
also testified that she believed that Simmons would physically try to stop
her if she had tried to leave. The trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Randall's and the individual defendants and Johnson ap-
pealed. The court of appeals reversed,302 and the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the summary judgment.30 3
Johnson argued that while she was not detained by physical force, Sim-
mons detained her by sternly insisting that she stay put.3°4 The court
observed that Johnson's argument was that Simmons impliedly
threatened her.30 5 However, Simmons did not even attempt to confine
Johnson to a particular area.306 Further, the court pointed out that John-
son's argument was conclusively negated by the fact that she twice left
the area to which she was allegedly confined. 307 The court concluded that
"an employer must be able to suggest, and even insist, that its employees
perform certain tasks in certain locations at certain times. 308
10. Civil Conspiracy
With increasing frequency, a plaintiff often claims that two or more
employees or supervisors conspired with the employer to terminate the
plaintiff's employment. To establish a claim for civil conspiracy, a plain-
tiff must show that there is a combination of two or more persons to ac-
complish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by an
unlawful means.309 The civil conspiracy must consist of wrongs that
would be actionable against the conspirators individually. 310 These con-
spiracy theories are usually rejected because all of the conduct of which
the employee complains occurred within the course and scope of the em-
ployees' and agents' service to the employer. 31' As a result, the civil con-
301. The elements of false imprisonment are: (1) willful detention; (2) without consent;
and (3) without authority of law. Id. at 169 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Castillo, 693
S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. 1985)).
302. Randall's, 869 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993).
303. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 640.




308. Randall's, 891 S.W.2d at 651.
309. Hennigan v. I.P. Petroleum Co., 848 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. App.-Beaumont),
rev'd in part, 858 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. 1993).
310. Id.
311. Johnson v. Randall's Food Markets, 869 S.W.2d 390, 399-400 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995).
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spiracy claim is defeated by the rule that a corporation cannot conspire
with itself.312
11. Fraud and Misrepresentation
In Camp v. Ruffin313 Robert Camp sued his employer, Harper Truck
(Harper), for fraud, misrepresentation and breach of contract when
Harper allegedly failed to pay Camp commissions and salary as Harper
had allegedly promised. The federal district court granted Harper's mo-
tion for summary judgment and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court ob-
served that to recover damages for fraud or misrepresentation Camp
must establish actual losses such as out-of-pocket damages or pecuniary
losses. 3 14 Thus, to prove fraud or misrepresentation, the court held that
Camp was required to provide evidence that he suffered an economic
injury which resulted from his reliance upon Harper's promise or repre-
sentation. 31 5 The court noted that evidence that Camp did not receive
what he was promised was not sufficient to support his.316 Because Camp
presented evidence of only expected losses rather than actual losses, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment.317
In Smith v. Block Drug Company318 Robert Smith sued his former em-
ployer, Block Drug Company (Block Drug) asserting various Title VII
claims and a state law fraud claim. 319 Block moved for summary judg-
ment on Smith's fraud claim, and the district court granted the motion.
The court determined that Smith did not raise a genuine issue of material
fact that Block Drug knowingly or recklessly made false statements. 320
The court noted that the basis of Smith's argument was that a document,
called the Gold Team Booklet, which described a compensation bonus
plan, was materially false. 32' However, the court found that Smith did
not provide any evidence that Block Drug knew that the statements in
the Gold Team Booklet were untrue when it provided that booklet to
Smith. 322 Therefore, the district court granted summary judgment to
Block Drug.323
312. Id.
313. Camp v. Ruffin, 30 F.3d 37 (5th Cir. 1994).




318. Smith v. Block Drug Co., No. H-92-2431 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 1994).
319. To prevail on his fraud clain, Smith was required to prove: (1) a material represen-
tation; (2) that the representation is false; (3) that the speaker knew it was false when he
made the statement or the speaker made the statement recklessly without knowledge of its
truth; (4) that the speaker intended the plaintiff to rely upon the statement; (5).that the
plaintiff relied on the statement; and (6) suffered damages. Id. (citing T.O. Stanley Boot







In Sebesta v. Kent Electronics Corporation324 Vicki Sebesta sued her
employer Kent Electronics Corporation (Kent) for fraud. Sebesta con-
tended that Kent falsely represented that she could credit her vacation
days for the days she served on jury duty. Sebesta also complained that
Kent had made false statements that the jury duty issue was resolved.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Kent, and Sebesta ap-
pealed. The court of appeals noted that some of the representations were
promises of continued employment.325 As such, they could not support a
claim for fraud because Sebesta's employment was terminable at-will. 326
Moreover, the court determined that Kent's representation that Sebesta
could credit her vacation days toward her jury service was not a false
statement.3 27 In fact, Kent paid Sebesta two days of vacation pay for the
time period Sebesta served on a jury. Therefore, the court affirmed the
summary judgment. 328
12. General Tort Claims
In Helena Labs. Corp. v. Snyder329 a corporate vice president and an
executive secretary, who were both married at the time, had an affair.
Both marriages ended in divorce. The respective ex-spouses of the He-
lena employees sued Helena for negligent interference with familial rela-
tions. The trial court granted Helena's motion for summary judgment
and the court of appeals reversed. The Texas Supreme Court reversed
and held that Texas does not recognize an independent cause of action
for negligent interference with the familial relationship. 330 The court
held that to adopt the plaintiffs' theory would be contrary to section 4.06
of the Texas Family Code331 and would impose liability on employers
when the employee would be shielded from responsibility for that con-
duct by section 4.06.332
In Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey333 Darlene Humphrey sued her deceased
husband's former employer, Shell Oil Company (Shell). Humphrey's
husband was terminated by Shell and later committed suicide.
Humphrey argued that Shell breached a duty to her husband when it ter-
minated him when he was in an unstable emotional condition. The jury
found for Humphrey and Shell appealed, arguing that it owed no duty of
care toward Humphrey's deceased husband when it terminated him. The
324. Sebesta v. Kent Elecs. Corp., 886 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, writ denied).
325. Id. at 464.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 465.
329. 886 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
330. Id. at 768.
331. Section 4.06 provides for "[a] right of action by one spouse against a third party for
alienation of affection is not authorized in this state." Thx. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 4.06
(Vernon 1993).
332. 886 S.W.2d at 769.
333. Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.]
1994, writ denied).
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court of appeals observed that the employment at-will doctrine bars con-
tract and tort claims which are based on the decision to terminate em-
ployment.334 The court discounted Humphrey's contention that Shell
should have reasonably foreseen that Humphrey's husband would harm
himself as a consequence of his termination.335 The court noted that
Shell's physician, who had visited with Humphrey's husband was not a
psychiatrist and had not referred Humphrey's husband for psychiatric
care. Moreover, Humphrey's husband was not irrational when he visited
the doctor and did not appear upset or overly agitated when he was ter-
minated. The court of appeals rejected Humphrey's argument that Shell
owed a managerial duty to warn Humphrey that it intended to terminate
her husband.336 The court determined that the employer had this duty
only if it could reasonably foresee that the plaintiff would commit sui-
cide.337 The court then noted that it was not reasonably foreseeable that
Humphrey's husband would commit suicide upon termination.338 In sum,
the court held that an employer does not owe a duty of care in regard to
the timing of a termination, unless it is reasonably foreseeable that the
termination will create a risk of danger.339
In DeLuna v. Guynes Printing Co. of Texas340 several individuals sued
Guynes Printing Company of Texas (Guynes) when they were injured in
an automobile accident involving an off-duty Guynes employee, Ar-
mando Cardoza. Cardoza and several other off-duty Guynes employees
were drinking beer in the parking lot next to Guynes. After consuming
several beers, Cardoza drove out onto a public road and eventually was
involved in the automobile accident. The plaintiffs sued Guynes, con-
tending that Guynes acted negligently by failing to direct Cardoza not to
drink and drive. The plaintiffs also argued that Guynes was negligent by
failing to warn Cardoza of the dangers of drinking and driving. The
plaintiffs argued that the Texas Supreme Court adopted this cause of ac-
tion by approving RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 in Kelsey-
Seybold Clinic v. Maclay.341 The trial court granted summary judgment
for Guynes, and the court of appeals affirmed. 342 The court agreed that
Guynes owed a duty to exercise ordinary care to control its employees
when the employees were on duty and on Guynes' premises.343 How-
ever, for an employer to have a duty in regard to an employee's off-duty
conduct, the employer must be aware of a dangerous condition involving
334. Id. at 176.
335. Id. at 177.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Shell Oil Co. v. Humphrey, 880 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1994, writ denied).
339. Id. at 178.
340. DeLuna v. Guynes Printing Co. of Tex., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.__EI Paso
1994, writ denied).
341. Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay, 466 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1971).




the employee and must exercise some kind of control over the em-
ployee.3" Employers who take no affirmative action to control an em-
ployee who becomes intoxicated off-duty owes no duty toward
individuals injured by an intoxicated employee.345
In Verdeur v. King Hospitality Corp.346 an employee of King Hospital-
ity Corporation (King) arrived at work intoxicated. Upon discovering the
employee's condition, the manager told her to leave. On her way home,
the employee was involved in an accident and was killed. The employee's
parents and daughter then sued King. The trial court granted summary
judgment for King on the ground that it owed no duty to the employee.
The court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals explained that in a
wrongful death or survival action, a plaintiff's cause of action is deriva-
tive of the deceased's rights. Consequently, in this case, because the em-
ployer owed no duty to the employee, the employer also owed no duty to
the plaintiffs.347 Next, the court explained that there generally is no duty
to control the action of third parties. However, an exception to this rule
applies when an employer exercises control over an employee because of
the employee's incapacity. 348 In these circumstances, the employer has a
duty to act as any other reasonably prudent employer would under the
same or similar circumstances to prevent the employee from causing
harm to others.349 However, the court held that this exception does not
impose a duty on the employer to prevent the employee from injuring
himself.350 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the summary
judgment.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Commentators have urged employees to pursue claims for violations of
their state constitutional rights when they sue their employers. These
claims have been unsuccessful.3 51
344. Id.
345. Id. at 210.
346. Verdeur v. King Hospitality Corp., 872 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994,
writ denied).
347. Id. at 301.
348. Id.
349. Id. (citing Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. 1983)).
350. Id. at 302.
351. Albertson's, Inc. v. Ortiz, 856 S.W.2d 836, 840 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ de-
nied) (Because Albertson's was a completely private entity, the court "decline[d] to recog-
nize a compensatory cause of action to redress a wholly private entity's infringement of
free-speech rights guaranteed by the state constitution"). The Austin Court of Appeals
also observed that it had refused to recognize a constitutional action for violations of arti-
cle I, § 8 of the Texas Constitution in the absence of state action. Id at 840 n.7 (citing
Weaver v. AIDS Servs., Inc., 835 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied)).
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C. STATUTORY CLAIMS
1. Retaliatory Discharge
The legislative purpose of the TEXAS LABOR CODE sections 451.001-
451.003352 (formerly article 8307c) 353 is to "protect persons who are enti-
tled to benefits under the workers' compensation law and to prevent
them from being discharged by reason of taking steps to collect such ben-
efits."'354 A plaintiff bringing a retaliatory discharge claim 355 has the bur-
den of establishing a causal link between the discharge from employment
and the claim for workers' compensation. 356 A plaintiff need not prove
that he was discharged solely because of his workers' compensation
claim; he need only prove that his claim was a determining or contribut-
ing factor in his discharge. 357 Thus, even if other reasons for discharge
exist, the plaintiff may still recover damages if retaliation is also a rea-
son.358 Causation may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence
and by the reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence. 359 Once the
link is established, the employer must rebut the alleged discrimination by
showing there was a legitimate reason behind the discharge. 36°
352. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-451.003 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
353. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993) (cur-
rent version at TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-451.003 (Vernon Supp. 1994)).
354. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).
355. Williams v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 816 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1991, writ denied). An employee bringing an 8307c cause of action against a gov-
ernmental unit is not required to comply with the notice provisions of the Texas Tort
Claims Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a) (Vernon 1986). Williams,
816 S.W.2d at 839.
356. Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990,
writ denied). In Paragon, the court identified four factors in concluding that sufficient
evidence supported the finding of a causal link between the filing of the claim and the
discharge: (1) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff were aware of his com-
pensation claim; (2) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff expressed a nega-
tive attitude toward the plaintiff's injured condition; (3) the company failed to adhere to
established company policies with regard to progressive disciplinary action; and (4) the
company discriminated in its treatment of the plaintiff in comparison to other employees
allegedly guilty of similar infractions. Id. at 658. These four factors may be useful in ana-
lyzing whether there is circumstantial evidence to support a causal link between the filing
of a workers' compensation claim and a subsequent discharge. See Fuerza Unida v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1993) (court held that the employees failed to
show that they were discriminated against (or treated differently) since the plant closure
resulted in the discharge of all employees, regardless of whether they had engaged in pro-
tested workers' compensation activities).
357. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Martin, 844 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1992, writ denied); Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d 826, 833 (Tex. App.-Aus-
tin 1992, writ denied); Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. App.-EI Paso
1992, no writ); Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1990, writ denied); Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1986), aff'd, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
358. Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 558-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981,
no writ).
359. Investment Properties Management, Inc. v. Montes, 821 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1991, no writ); Paragon, 783 S.W.2d at 658.
360. Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598,599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
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Section 451 provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to reasonable
damages and is entitled to reinstatement to his or her former position.361
The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "reasonable dam-
ages" in section two to embrace both actual and exemplary damages. 362
Actual damages can include lost past wages, lost future wages, lost past
retirement, lost future retirement, and other benefits which are ascertain-
able with reasonable certainty. Employees seeking reinstatement on the
ground that they were wrongfully discharged must show that they are
presently able to perform the duties of the job that they had before the
injury.363
The federal courts continue to follow Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc.364
in finding that the retaliatory discharge provision is a civil action arising
under the workers' compensation laws of Texas and, therefore, not re-
movable to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1445(C). 3 6 5 How-
ever, such a claim may nevertheless be removed if it is pendent to a
federal question claim. 366
In Tatum v. Progressive Polymers, Inc. 367 Michael Tatum worked for
Progressive Polymers (Progressive) when he suffered an on-the-job in-jury. Tatum then left Progressive, but later reapplied. When Progressive
did not rehire him, Tatum filed suit based upon retaliatation for filing a
workers' compensation claim. After a jury trial, the jury found for Pro-
gressive. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed. 368 The court noted
that when Tatum sought re-employment, he requested placement in a
specific job and a salary at his pre-injury level.369 When a position that
met both criteria became available, it was offered to Tatum.370 There-
fore, the court found that sufficient evidence supported the jury's
verdict.371
361. TEx..REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1993) (repealed 1993) (now
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 451.001-451.003 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
362. Azar Nut, 734 S.W.2d at 669.
363. Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-lYler 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
364. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employ-
ment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1765-66 (1992) (dis-
cussing Fifth Circuit's decision in Roadway Express).
365. Roadway Express, 931 F.2d at 1092; see Almaza v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 802 F.
Supp. 1474, 1475 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Keyser v. Kroger Co., 800 F. Supp. 476, 477 (N.D. Tex.
1992); Addison v. Sedco Forex, U.S.A., 798 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 (N.D. Tex. 1992); see also
Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590 (5th Cir. 1993).
366. See Cedillo v. Valcar Enters. & Darling Delaware Co., 773 F. Supp. 932, 939-42(N.D. Tex. 1991) (workers' compensation retaliation claim could be entertained when pen-
dent to a related and removable federal question claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
367. Tatum v. Progressive Polymers, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-'lyler 1994, no
writ).
368. Id. at 838.
369. Id at 837-38.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 838.
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In Texas Division-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza 72 Mark Carrozza sued
Texas Division-Tranter, Inc. (Tranter) alleging that Tranter terminated
him in retaliation for pursuing a workers' compensation claim. Tranter
countered that it terminated Carrozza because he did not report to work
for several days in violation of Tranter's policy which requires employees
to obtain permission before being absent. Pursuant to this policy, Tranter
was mandatorily terminated. On this ground, the trial court granted sum-
mary judgment to Tranter. The Texas Supreme Court reviewed Tranter's
summary judgment evidence which clearly provided that Carrozza was
terminated for violating the attendance policy. 373 The court also noted
that Carrozza did not present any evidence directly contradicting
Tranter's explanation, but instead filed an affidavit containing his own
objective beliefs that he had been terminated in retaliation for filing a
workers' compensation claim.374 The supreme court discounted this affi-
davit and affirmed the summary judgment.375 The court explained that
termination as a result of uniform enforcement of an attendance policy
does not constitute retaliatory discharge under article 8307c. 376
In Cooper v. Raiford377 Bill Cooper sued his former employers, Aubrey
Raiford and Raiford Buick GMC Trucks (Raiford), for wrongful dis-
charge in violation of article 8307c 378 and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The lawsuit arose out of an on-the-job injury Cooper
suffered. Cooper filed and pursued a workers' compensation claim, and
Raiford terminated Cooper. Cooper sued, contending that he was termi-
nated in retaliation for filing and pursuing the workers' compensation
claim. Raiford filed a motion for summary judgment contending that
Cooper's claims failed as a matter of law. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment, and Cooper appealed. The court of appeals reversed.
First, the court noted, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection be-
tween the filing of the workers' compensation claim and his or her subse-
quent dismissal.379 Once that burden is satisfied, the employer then is
charged with the responsibility of proving a non-retaliatory, non-pretex-
tual reason for the discharge.380 The court observed that Cooper
presented some evidence that Raiford discouraged him from filing a
claim under the workers' compensation statute. 381 Because of this evi-
dence, the court concluded that there was a fact issue as to Cooper's arti-
cle 8307c cause of action.382
372. Texas Division-Tranter, Inc. v. Carrozza, 876 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1994).
373. Id. at 313.
374. Id. at 314.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Cooper v. Raiford, No. 09-93-161CV, 1994 WL 529945 (Tex. App.-Beaumont,
Sept. 29, 1994, n.w.h.).
378. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN., art. 8307c (Vernon 1993), repealed by Act of May 2,







In Hinerman v. Gunn Chevrolet38 3 Mara Hinerman sued her former
employer, Gunn Chevrolet (Gunn), contending that she was fired in vio-
lation of article 8307c. Gunn, a non-subscriber under the Act, argued
that Hinerman was fired because she left work early without permission.
In response, Hinerman asserted that she had permission to leave work
and only left work in order to receive medical treatment for her on-the-
job injury. The court of appeals found that Hinerman established a genu-
ine issue of material fact as to whether Gunn discharged Hinerman as
retaliation for pursuing compensation benefits. 384 The court explained
that Hinerman presented summary judgment evidence that she informed
Gunn of the work-related injury and her need for medical treatment.385
The court also noted that it could be inferred from Hinerman's summary
judgment evidence that Gunn terminated her because she was required
to leave work to undergo physical therapy because of the on-the-job in-
jury.386 The court concluded that this fact was circumstantial evidence of
a causal connection between Hinerman's discharge and her claim for ben-
efits. 387 Therefore, the court reversed the summary judgment.388
In Pacesetter Corp. v. Barrickman389 Terry Barrickman sued his former
employer, Pacesetter Corporation, for retaliatory discharge under article
8307c. In May 1989, Barrickman was given notice that he might be dis-
charged in thirty days unless his performance improved. On June 9, Bar-
rickman sustained an on-the-job injury that required back surgery. On
June 16, he reported the injury to Pacesetter and he was fired forty-five
minutes later. Barrickman later sued, and in March 1992 Pacesetter of-
fered Barrickman full reinstatement to his former position. He was again
fired three days later when he refused to sign an independent contractor's
agreement that would deny him benefits which he had previously re-
ceived. One month later, Barrickman declined an offer for reinstatement
without regard to the independent contractor's agreement. The jury
found for Barrickman and the court of appeals affirmed. The court held
that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Bar-
rickman was discharged in violation of article 8307c.390 The court ob-
served that Barrickman was fired only forty-five minutes after notifying
Pacesetter of the injury, and only twenty-one days after he had been
given a thirty-day warning.391 The court also observed that Barrickman's
performance was within the range of performance of other sales people
383. Hinerman v. Gunn Chevrolet, 877 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ
requested).
384. Id at 808.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 809.
388. Id.
389. 885 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.-lyler 1994, no writ).
390. Id. at 261.
391. Id.
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and that Barrickman actually outperformed the supervisor who fired
him.39z
In Jordan v. Johnson Controls, Inc.393 R.C. Jordan sued Johnson Con-
trols, Inc. (Johnson) for wrongful discharge under article 8307c.394 John-
son filed a motion for summary judgment against Jordan's claims,
asserting that Jordan's falsified employment application 395 constituted a
violation of Johnson's policies and an independent ground for termina-
tion. The trial court held that the after-acquired evidence doctrine per-
mitted Johnson to use this information to defend against the retaliatory
discharge claim. On appeal, the court of appeals adopted the after-ac-
quired evidence doctrine and affirmed that the doctrine barred Jordan's
article 8307c claim.396 While after-acquired evidence cannot be used to
justify a wrongful discharge, 397 the court held that after-acquired evi-
dence of an independent ground for termination is relevant to the issue of
injury and may, as in this case, preclude an award of relief.398
Article 8307c prohibits both discharge and discrimination against em-
ployee for filing a workers' compensation claim.399 In Castro v. U.S. Nat-
ural Resources, Inc.4°° Reynaldo Castro sued U.S. Natural Resources,
Inc. (U.S. Natural) for retaliatory discharge after being placed on long-
term leave of absence when he attempted to return to work after suffer-
ing an on-the-job injury. Castro had previously hired a lawyer and pur-
sued workers' compensation benefits in connection with his injury.401 At
trial, the trial court refused Castro's jury question asking whether U.S.
Natural discharged or discriminated against Castro in violation of the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Instead, the trial court submitted a
question that deleted the language "or discriminated." When the trial
court rendered a take-nothing judgment for U.S. Natural, Castro ap-
pealed. The court of appeals held that the trial court's failure to submit
the jury question requesting a finding regarding discharge or discrimina-
tion was reversible error/ °2 The court explained that article 8307c pre-
cludes discharge or any other discriminatory act taken against an
392. It at 261-62. The court also affirmed the award of damages beyond the date of
the employer's second offer of reinstatement. While Barrickman had a duty to mitigate his
damages, the evidence that Barrickman searched for employment extensively and the cir-
cumstances of the offer of reinstatement supported the conclusion that Barrickman did in
fact mitigate his damages. Id. at 263.
393. Jordan v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 881 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ
denied).
394. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 8307c (Vernon 1993), repealed by Act of May 2,
1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 269, § 5(1), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1273.
395. Jordan omitted his armed-robbery conviction from his employment application.
396. Id. at 366.
397. Id.
398. It.
399. Castro v. U.S. Natural Resources, Inc., 880 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1994, writ denied).
400. Id.
401. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ArN., art. 8307c (Vernon 1993), repealed by Act of May 2,
1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 269, § 5(1), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1273.
402. Id. at 67.
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employee for pursuing a workers' compensation claim.403 Therefore, the
jury question should have included the reference to discrimination.4 4
The court reasoned that placing an employee on an indefinite leave of
absence could be considered a discriminatory act.40 5 Therefore, the trial
court's take-nothing judgment was reversed.406
In Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirkgard40 7 several employees of
Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. (THE) were terminated for refusing to
sign a waiver of their rights under the Worker's Compensation Act. The
former employees eventually sued THE alleging violations of article
8307c. 40 8 THE, a non-subscriber under the Texas Workers' Compensa-
tion Act,409 created an employee injury benefit plan which was dissimilar
to workers' compensation. After creating this plan, THE required all of
its employees to sign a waiver, forfeiting all common law claims against
THE arising from THE's failure to provide a safe workplace. The former
employees refused to sign the waiver, were fired and subsequently sued.
The jury found for the former employees, and THE appealed. The court
of appeals affirmed.4 10 The court explained that article 8307c creates du-
ties for all employers, both subscribers and non-subscribers.4 11 More-
over, article 8307c prohibits retaliatory actions against employees even
before claims have been filed.41 2 The court determined that the former
employees had a valid cause of action under article 8307c even though
they never had filed a workers' compensation claim.413
2. Commission on Human Rights Act
The Texas Legislature amended the Commission on Human Rights
Act 414 to conform the Act to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1991 which
amended similar federal employment law. The amendments apply to a
complaint of discrimination filed on or after September 1, 1993. 415 The
amendment broadens the remedies available to victims of discrimination
to mirror federal law.416 In addition to the remedy of reinstatement, back
pay, and perhaps front pay, plaintiffs may recover actual and exemplary
damages, subject to cap by the size of the employer's business.4 17 The




407. Texas Health Enters., Inc. v. Kirkgard, 882 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1994, writ denied).
408. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 8307c (Vernon 1993), repealed by Act of May 2,
1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 269, § 5(1), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1273.
409. Id.
410. Texas Health, 882 S.W.2d at 635.
411. Id. at 633.
412. Id.
413. Id
414. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-21.306 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
415. Act of Sept. 1, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 276, § 9, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 860 (to be
codified at TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001) (historical notes).
416. Id.
417. Id. ch. 276, § 7.
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caps are: $50,000 for businesses of 15 to 100 employees; $100,000 for busi-
nesses of 101 to 200 employees; $200,000 for businesses of 201 to 500
employees; and $300,000 for businesses of more than 500 employees. 418
The damages subject to the caps are in addition to back or front pay,
which are not covered by federal or state law.
In the past, the Act's definition of a "person with a disability" did not
include persons "regarded as impaired" by the defendant, but who are
really not impaired.419 The amendment, however, adds this category of
persons to those protected under the Act.
Elected public officials are covered by the Act for the first time.420
Also, private employers may use as a defense to a discrimination claim
their own work force diversity program and educational outreach to his-
torical victims of discrimination (which state employers are required to
develop). 421
The burdens of proof in disparate impact cases have also been changed
by the amendments. A disparate impact case involves a challenge to a
facially neutral employment practice (such as achievement tests) which
may have a discriminatory impact in practice. The employer must now
prove that such practices, if challenged, are job-related and consistent
with business necessity.422
A plaintiff now has two years from the date of conduct that allegedly
caused the discrimination to file suit, rather than the one-year require-
ment under prior law.423 Unchanged by the amendments, jury trials will
be available under the Act consistent with the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Caballero v. Central Power & Light Co. 424 Under the amend-
ments, the Commission on Human Rights is directed to establish an Of-
fice of Dispute Resolution to which either party to a charge of
discrimination may refer the matter.425 While not binding unless the par-
ties agree, the process should benefit employers and employees alike. In
a similar vein, the amendments expressly recognize and approve the use
of private dispute resolution. 426 The settlement of any claim under this
procedure will be binding on the parties.
In Bernard v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.427 Robert Bernard, se-
nior litigation counsel for Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. (BFI), alleged,
among other things, that he had been terminated from his position as
senior litigation counsel because of his age. BFI moved for summary
judgment on the basis that Bernard failed to exhaust his administrative
418. Id.
419. Id. ch. 276, § 2.
420. Id.
421. Id. ch. 276, § 4.
422. Id. ch 269, § 1.
423. Id ch. 276, § 7.
424. 858 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Tex. 1993).
425. Id. ch. 276, § 6.
426. Id.




remedies under the CHRA. The trial court granted the defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment and Bernard appealed. On appeal Bernard
argued that (1) an aggrieved person is not required to exhaust the admin-
istrative process when irreparable harm may occur and the administrative
agency is unable to provide immediate relief; and (2) that he exhausted
his administrative remedies by filing his charge of discrimination with the
Commission while simultaneously filing his original petition in the trial
court on the same day. The court of appeals rejected Bernard's argu-
ments. The court held that the Texas Supreme Court made it clear in
Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc.428 that a statutory prerequisite to fil-
ing suit in district court was the filing of a complaint with the Commis-
sion.429 The court added that Schroeder also requires the exhaustion of
administrative remedies as a mandatory prerequisite to filing a civil ac-
tion in district court. 430 The court concluded that Bernard had not ex-
hausted his administrative remedies by filing his complaint with the
Commission and his original petition in district court on the same day, or
by ultimately receiving a "right to sue" letter from the Commission.431
As the court observed, "to permit original judicial action without giving
the agency a chance to act" would make the Commission's role meaning-
less.4 3 2 Because Bernard had not exhausted his administrative remedies,
the court of appeals held that the trial court was without subject matter
jurisdiction over the complaint and, therefore, they dismissed Bernard's
age discrimination claim for lack of jurisidiction.4 33
In Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods, Corp.434 Deborah Ewald sued her
former employer, Wornick Family Foods Corp. (Wornick) for sexual har-
assment under the CHRA. Ewald argued that she was subjected to quid
pro quo harassment435 and hostile working environment 436 in that she
was subjected to sexually harassing remarks and requests for sexual fa-
428. 813 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. 1991).
429. Bernard, 1994 WL 575520 at *2 (citing Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 485).
430. Id. (citing Schroeder, 813 S.W.2d at 488).
431. Id. at *3.
432. Id.
433. Id. at *5 & n.13 (citing City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.
1985)).
434. Ewald v. Wornick Family Foods Corp., 878 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1994, writ denied).
435. The elements of quid pro quo sexual harassment claim are: (1) the employee was a
member of a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual ad-
vances or requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex;
(4) the employee's submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or implied con-
dition for receiving job benefits or that the employee's refusal to submit to a supervisor's
sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and (5) the existence of respondeat
superior. Id. at 658-59 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 662 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir.
1982)).
436. The elements of sexual harassment due to a hostile working environment are: (1)
the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwel-
come sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment complained of was
based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take remedial action. Id. at 659 (citing Henson, 662 F.2d at 909).
1190 [Vol. 48
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
vors from her supervisor. Ewald was told by her supervisor that if she
submitted to his sexual demands he would make certain that she was
transferred out of the freezer section. He also brushed his pelvic area
against her while the two were alone. Ewald did not return to work after
the incident, but eventually called Wornick to inform them that she was
quitting her position because of the incident with her supervisor.
Wornick immediately investigated Ewald's claim and Alonzo was fired.
Wornick encouraged Ewald to return to work and placed her on a differ-
ent team and told her to report if she was ever harassed by her previous
supervisor's "supporters." Ewald never reported any additional harass-
ment. However, Ewald began experiencing attendance and punctuality
problems, arriving late to work and failing to report to work altogether.
These were clear violations of Wornick's attendance and punctuality poli-
cies. Wornick warned Ewald in writing that continued violations would
result in termination. Still, Ewald did not report to work for three con-
secutive days. Wornick then terminated Ewald. Ultimately, Ewald quit
because of the harassment and sued. Wornick filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment which the trial court granted.
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment as to
Ewald's sexual harassment claim and held that Ewald's summary judg-
ment evidence created a fact issue.437 The court also held that Ewald's
evidence created an issue of fact as to her claim for assault and battery. 438
With respect to Ewald's claim of retaliation for complaining about sexual
harassment, the court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment. The
court noted that an employer may not retaliate against employees who
file discrimination complaints. 439 The court held, however, that the un-
disputed evidence was that Ewald had been terminated for violating
Wornick's attendance and punctuality policies."
In Central Power & Light Co. v. Bradbury441 Don Bradbury sued Cen-
tral Power & Light (CP&L), his former employer, alleging that CP&L
discriminated against him because of his handicap.442 Bradbury suffered
from atopic dermatitis (eczema) which is exacerbated by exposure to dry,
cooled air like that found at the CP&L workplace. Bradbury alleged that
he had been terminated after CP&L failed to accommodate his handicap,
which precluded Bradbury from effectively completing his required train-
ing. The case was tried to the bench and the trial court entered judgment
against CP&L. On appeal, the court of appeals first determined whether
Bradbury was "handicapped" as defined under the Act." 3 The court
noted that a handicap is a condition which requires special ambulatory
437. Id. at 659-60.
438. Id. at 660.
439. Id. (citing TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 5.05(a)(1) (Vernon 1987)).
440. It
441. Central Power & Light Co. v. Bradbury, 871 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1994, writ denied).
442. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987).
443. Id. at 863.
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devices or services. 444 Bradbury argued that the treatment he received -
prescription drugs, office visits and cortisone - constituted special am-
bulatory devices or services. The court disagreed and determined that
these forms of treatment are not special ambulatory devises or serv-
ices.445 Therefore, the court held, Bradbury's atopic dermatitis was not a
handicap as defined under the Act.44 6
In Farrington v. Sysco Food Services447 Willie Farrington contended
that during his employment he was harassed because of his race and af-
forded fewer advancement opportunities and less compensation on the
basis of his race. Sysco Food Services (Sysco), on the other hand, argued
that it never harassed Farrington and that he received fewer job responsi-
bilities and less pay only because he lacked seniority in comparison with
other employees at Farrington's same job level. Farrington did not con-
test Sysco's evidence. In addition, Sysco contended that Farrington was
fired after he admitted that he may have been under the influence of
cocaine while on the job. Presented with this evidence, the trial court
granted Sysco's motion for summary judgment, and Farrington appealed.
The court of appeals observed that Farrington must first establish a
prime facie case of discrimination by establishing that the failure to pro-
mote him to a management position had been racially motivated, and
then the burden would shift to Sysco to prove legitimate non-discrimina-
tory reasons for the decision. 448 Sysco attached evidence of Farrington's
deposition testimony in which he admitted that all four of the managers
promoted had more seniority with Sysco than he did. The burden of pro-
duction then shifted back to Farrington to show that the reason proffered
by Sysco was a pretext for race discrimination. Because Farrington pro-
duced no evidence that the seniority system was a pretext for race dis-
crimination, the court affirmed the summary judgment.449 The court also
concluded that because Farrington had brought forth no evidence of har-
assment, summary judgment was also proper in that regard.450
3. Unemployment Compensation Act
In Potts v. Texas Employment Commission451 Donnie Potts appealed to
the trial court the Texas Employment Commission's (TEC) denial of un-
employment benefits. The TEC and Potts' former employer, Abco Inc.,
subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment which the trial court
granted. On appeal, Potts argued that the trial court had erred in grant-




447. 865 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
448. Id. at 251.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 252.
451. Potts v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 884 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no
writ).
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not compare with TEC's decision. Specifically, Potts contended that the
alleged wrongful conduct, which had resulted in his termination, does not
qualify as "misconduct" under the Unemployment Compensation Act.452
The court of appeals disagreed,453 and noted that repeated acts of care-
lessness, when an employee has intermittent periods of proper perform-
ance, can constitute misconduct. 454 Therefore, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's summary judgment.455
In Texas Employment Commission v. Morgan456 Clay Morgan, a truck
driver for Leprino Foods (Leprino), suffered an injury to his right elbow
while on the job and began receiving treatments from a doctor. Morgan's
right elbow did not improve, but his doctor eventually released him to full
duty because Morgan's insurance benefits would no longer pay for the
doctors visits. Upon returning to work, Morgan reinjured his elbow.
Leprino then suspended Morgan without pay for a week. Several weeks
later, when Morgan did not return to work, Leprino informed Morgan
that he was required to report to work or suffer termination. While Mor-
gan returned to work the next day, he was unable to perform his duties as
a truck driver and Leprino terminated him. Morgan sought unemploy-
ment benefits, but the TEC determined that he was disqualified from re-
ceiving benefits. After an administrative hearing, the TEC determined
that Morgan did not provide verifiable medical evidence that he was un-
able to perform his duties. Therefore, his failure to perform the duties
constituted misconduct and mismanagement of his employment position.
Morgan appealed the TEC's decision to a trial court. The court deter-
mined that Morgan had not committed misconduct and was not disquali-
fied from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. The TEC
appealed, contending that the trial court erred by reversing the TEC deci-
sion, arguing that it was supported by substantial evidence. On appeal,
the court of appeals noted that a TEC decision is presumptively valid.457
The court stated that a TEC decision will be affirmed if there is substan-
tial evidence to support it.458 The court considered whether there was
substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Morgan's refusal to
work constituted misconduct.459 Citing Levellan Independent School Dis-
452. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-17(q) (Vernon 1987). The statute has
been repealed and codified, and the definition of "misconduct" is found in TEx. LABOR
CODE ANN. § 201.012(a) (Vernon Supp. 1995). Section 201.012(a) provides: "'Miscon-
duct' means mismanagement of a position of employment by action or inaction, neglect
that jeopardizes the life of property of another, intentional wrongdoing or malfeasance,
intentional violation of a law, or violation of a policy or rule adopted to ensure the orderly
work and safety of employees." Id.
453. 884 S.W.2d at at 883.
454. Id. at 883 (citing Texas Employment Comm'n v. Tates, 769 S.W.2d 290, 292-93(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ).
455. Id
456. Texas Employment Comm'n v. Morgan, 877 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, no writ).
457. Id at 13.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 14.
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trict v. Contreras,460 the court noted that the record did not indicate that
Leprino warned Morgan of repeated violations of company policy.
Rather, the evidence indicated that Morgan was praised for his work.
Considering this evidence, the court reasoned that Morgan did not mis-
manage his position by inaction or neglect and, therefore, was not guilty
of misconduct.' 61 Therefore, the court determined that the trial court
properly held that Morgan was not disqualified from receiving unemploy-
ment compensation benefits.462
The Texas Employment Commission recently considered a claimant's
appeal of the TEC Appeal Tribunal's (the Tribunal) interpretation of sec-
tion 207.048 of the Unemployment Compensation Act.4 63 The claimaint,
James Dostalik, is a member of the Road Sprinker Fitters Local Union,
No. 669 (the Union), and was employed by Grinnel Fire Protection
(Grinnel). The collective bargaining agreement between the Union and
Grinnel expired, and the two parties began negotiations to create a new
agreement. Negotiations ended after Grinnel informed the Union that it
could no longer contribute on behalf of employees to the Union's Health
and Welfare Pension Fund. Moreover, Grinnel informed the Union that
employees would be required to make their own contributions to insur-
ance and pension plans, which decreased Dostalik's salary by approxi-
mately twenty-two percent. The Union went on strike, and Dostalik
joined in the walk-out. Eventually, Dostalik sought unemployment com-
pensation benefits. The initial claim was approved, but the Tribunal re-
versed, determining that section 207.48 of the Unemployment
Compensation Act 464 precluded Dostalik from receiving benefits since
Dostalik's unemployment was caused by his own decision to stop working
pursuant to a labor dispute. Dostalik then appealed that decision to the
TEC. The Commission, in a 2-1 decision, disagreed with the Tribunal's
conclusion regarding the cause of Dostalik's work stoppage. 465 The Com-
mission determined that Grinnel constructively locked out Dostalik when
Grinnel unilaterally changed the terms of Dostalik's employment, and
that the change was so unreasonable that Dostalik had no choice but to
withhold his labor and strike. Therefore, the Commission concluded that
because Dostalik's work stoppage was caused by Grinnel's constructive
lock-out, Dostalik was not disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits.
460. Levelland Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Contreras, 865 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1993, writ denied).
461. Morgan, 877 S.W.2d at 15.
462. Id.
463. Tex. Employment Comm'n, Application of James Dostalik for Unemployment
Compensation, Comm'n Appeal No. 94-014528-10-092494 (Dec. 27, 1994).
464. TEx. LABOR CODE ANN. § 207.48 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
465. The Commissioner representing employers dissented.
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III. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
Generally, an agreement not to compete is a restraint of trade and is
unenforceable because it violates public policy. 466 The Texas Constitu-
tion declares that monopolies created by the state or a political subdivi-
sion are not permitted because they are contrary to the "genius of a free
government. '467 In 1889, the Texas Legislature enacted its first antitrust
law, and it remained almost unchanged until the passage of the Texas
Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983.4 8 Generally, this legislation
prohibits contracts, combinations or conspiracies that unreasonably re-
strain trade or commerce.469 Historically, Texas courts have closely scru-
tinized private sector contracts which restrain trade.470 However, the
Covenant Not to Compete Act471 protects noncompetition agreements if
they meet certain statutory criteria.472
In Light v. Centel Cellular Co. 473 Light began working for United
Telespectrum, Inc. (United) as a salesperson in 1985. In 1987, Light
signed an employment agreement with United. The agreement provided
that Light was terminable at the will of either Light or United. The
agreement also included a covenant by which Light agreed not to com-
pete with United in a certain geographical area for a one year period
following her termination. Following her resignation, Light sued Centel,
466. Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1991); Martin v.
Credit Protection Ass'n, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990); DeSantis v. Wackenhut
Corp., 793 S.W.2d 681, 681 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 755 (1991) (citing Frankie-
wicz v. National Comp. Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505,507 (Tex. 1982); Weatherford Oil Tool Co.
v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRAS § 186 (1981)); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660,
662 (Tex. 1990); Zep Mfg. Co. v. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992,
no writ). For a thorough analysis of the enforceablity of noncompetition aggreements, see
Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1789-95 (1992).
467. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26.
468. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.51 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
469. The Texas Supreme Court noted in DeSantis that while a noncompetition agree-
ment is a restraint on trade, only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade violate
the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 687.
470. See e.g., Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Tex. 1991);
Queens Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250,24 S.W. 397 (1893); Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press &
Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and
Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1785-97 (1992) (analyzing
factors).
471. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
472. The Covenant Not to Compete Act provides:
If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope
of activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater re-
straint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to
cause the limitations contained in the coveant as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a re-
straint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or ither busi-
ness interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed ....
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
473. 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994).
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the successor in interest to United, asserting that the noncompetition
agreement was unenforceable and void. The trial court rendered judg-
ment in favor of Light. The court of appeals reversed and rendered judg-
ment that Light take nothing against Centel, holding that the covenant
not to compete was enforceable, and Light appealed. The supreme court
withdrew its original opinion 474 and granted rehearing of the cause. 475
In General Devices, Inc. v. Bacon476 General Devices, Inc. (GDI) sued
two of its former employees, Roger Bacon and Allan Shannon, claiming
that the employees breached a covenant not to compete and interfered
with GDI's contractual relationships with other GDI employees and one
of GDI's clients, LTV Aerospace and Defense and Vought Corporation
(LTV). Bacon and Shannon replied that the covenant not to compete
was invalid and that they therefore did not tortiously interfere with any of
GDI's contracts. The trial court granted GDI's motion for summary
judgment and the case was later tried. At the close of GDI's case-in-
chief, the trial court granted a directed verdict to Bacon and Shannon, on
the ground that GDI did not present sufficient evidence of damages.
GDI appealed and Bacon and Shannon cross-appealed, contending that
the trial court erred by finding that the covenant not to compete was
enforceable. The court of appeals held that the covenant not to compete
was unenforceable because it did not define a specific, limited geographic
area to which the covenant applied. 477 Also, the covenant did not estab-
lish any time period during which the restriction on competition would be
applicable.478 Because the covenant was not limited as to time and geo-
graphic area, it was unenforceable as a matter of law.479 However, the
court found that the trial court properly denied Bacon and Shannon's
motion for summary judgment in regard to GDI's tortious interference
with contract claim.480 The court noted that even though the contracts
between GDI and its employees and GDI and LTV were terminable at-
474. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 17 (Oct. 6, 1993). The Texas Supreme Court, relying on its prior
decisions in Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) and Travel
Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1992), originally held that the cove-
nant was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement, was an unreasonable re-
straint of trade, and was unenforceable on the grounds of public policy. In so holding, the
court reasoned that an "employment agreement" consisting entirely of a covenant not to
compete and containing no terms or provisions usually associated with an employment
contract was not an "otherwise enforceable agreement." Furthermore, the court reasoned
that the employment-at-will relationship could not be considered an "otherwise enforcea-
ble agreement" because the at-will relationship could be terminated at any time by either
party. The Texas Supreme Court specifically declined to determine whether §§ 15.50 and
15.51 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code or the 1993 amendments to those sec-
tions would apply retroactively, noting that the application of those sections or their
amendments "would not require a result in this case different from the one we reach
today."
475. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 426-27 (Feb. 2, 1994) (argued Feb. 17, 1994).
476. General Devices, Inc. v. Bacon, 888 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ




480. Id. at 501.
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will, until terminated, the contracts were valid and third parties were pro-
hibited from tortiously interfering with it.481
IV. BEYOND NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
In addition to actions based on a breach of contract theory arising from
a noncompetition agreement, employers may rely on various causes of
action to protect trade secrets against appropriation by former employees
and disclosure to competitors.482 An employer may sue for unfair com-
petition, which is based on fraud in which a party has suffered or will
suffer consequential harm. Two elements are necessary to obtain injunc-
tive or monetary relief - existence of a trade secret and its unconsented
use or disclosure. This cause of action is separate and distinct from any
breach of contract for alleged violation of a noncompetition agreement.
Additionally, an employer may sue for breach of nondisclosure contract,
if one exists, or breach of confidential relationship.4 83
In Texas, a trade secret is defined as:
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to ob-
tain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It
may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufactur-
ing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other
device, or a list of customers .... 484
Secrecy is key to establishing the existence of a trade secret.485 The infor-
mation may not be readily available or generally known.486 "However,
when money and time are invested in the development of a procedure or
device which is based on an idea which is not new to a particular industry,
and when that certain procedure or device is not generally known, trade
secret protection will exist. '487 One court placed importance on the ef-
forts made by the employer to keep the information at issue from com-
petitors.4m Thus, if the information provides a competitive advantage to
481. Id.
482. See also P. Jerome Richey & Margaret J. Bosik, Trade Secrets and Restrictive Cove-
nants, 4 LAB. LAW. 21 (1988).
483. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no
writ) ("Protection is available even in the absence of an express agreement not to disclose
materials; when a confidential relationship exists, the law will imply an agreement not to
disclose trade secrets.").
484. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
898 (1958) (adopting definition in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)); see M.
N. Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (customer lists and pricing information are trade secrets).
485. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 631.
486. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 264 (suit involving breach of confidential relationship and
unfair competition).
487. Id. (emphasis added); see Bryan v. Kershaw, 366 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 959 (1967); Ventura Mfg. Co. v. Locke, 454 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1970, no writ).
488. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 265.
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its user, it may be a trade secret.489 Other factors considered by the
courts include the existence of a nondisclosure agreement and the nature
and extent of security precautions to prevent unauthorized disclosure or
use of the information.49 On the other hand, where the procedures and
equipment used in a business are well-known within an industry or gener-
ally known and readily available, the training and knowledge gained by
an employee about the procedures are unlikely to be considered protect-
able interests.491 Additionally, former employees are free to use general
knowledge, skill, and experience acquired during employment 492 or infor-
mation publicly disclosed.4 93
Generally, employers can protect secret customer lists and other confi-
dential information from use by former employees and preclude the em-
ployee from using it in competition with the employer. Some Texas cases
analyze the difficulty in obtaining customer lists in determining whether
such lists are confidential information and hold that if the information is
readily accessible by industry inquiry, then the lists are not protected,4 94
while other Texas cases hold that even if the information is readily acces-
sible, if the competitor gained the information in usable form while work-
ing for the former employer, then the information is protected.495 For
example, a former employee may not use knowledge of purchasing agents
and credit ratings of the customers of his former employer to compete
against that employer. 496 Similarly, one court granted an injunction to
prevent a former employee from competing against his former employer
through the use of disparaging remarks about his former employer's
products based on the employee's inside knowledge and experience.497
Thus, if secret information comes into an employee's possession due to a
489. Murrco Agency, 800 S.W.2d at 605 n.7.
490. See Daily Int'l Sales v. Eastman Whipstock, 662 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton (1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); Rimes v. Club Corp. of Am., 542 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (information learned during employment for which
there was no duty of nondisclosure imposed by the employer may be used freely by the
employee after employment termination).
491. Recon Exploration, Inc. v. Hodges, 798 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
no writ) (geophysical exploration procedures known in the trade); Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at
264; Hall v. Hall, 326 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(manner of making and installing product widely known); see also Wissman v. Boucher,
150 Tex. 326, 330, 240 S.W.2d 278, 279 (1951) (common knowledge is not a trade secret).
492. Executive Tele-Communications Sys. v. Buchbaum, 669 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
493. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 764.
494. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 632-33 (citing Numed, Inc. v. McNutt, 724 S.W.2d
432, 434-35 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Allan J. Richardson & Assoc., Inc. v.
Andrews, 718 S.W.2d 833, 836-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Brooks,
503 S.W.2d at 684-85; Research Equip. Co. v. C. H. Galloway & Scientific Cages, Inc., 485
S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); SCM Corp. v. Triplett Co., 399
S.W.2d 583, 568-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, no writ)).
495. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 633 (citing American Precision Vibrator Co. v. Na-
tional Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274, 276-78 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no
writ)); Jeter, 607 S.W.2d at 275-76; Crouch, 468 S.W.2d at 607-08.
496. Crouch, 468 S.W.2d at 605-07.
497. Johnston v. Am. Speedreading Academy, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
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confidential relationship with the employer, the employee has a duty not
to commit a breach of the confidence by disclosing or otherwise using it
to the employer's disadvantage.498 When a former employee commits the
tort of unfair competition, an employer may be able to enjoin the em-
ployee from using or disclosing the secret or confidential information.499
In addition, monetary damages can be awarded for lost profits based on
the difference between the employer's market position before and after
the misappropriation of the confidential information.500
V. ERISA AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
The primary purpose of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) 501 is to protect the interests of participants in employee
benefit plans and their beneficiaries. 502 Accordingly, ERISA requires
disclosure and reporting, establishes certain fiduciary standards of con-
duct, responsibility, and obligation, and authorizes appropriate penalties
against employers, trustees, and other entities who fail to comply with its
mandates. 50 3 With respect to employment status, ERISA strictly prohib-
its discharging an employee under certain circumstances. 504
The United States Supreme Court defined the breadth and impact of
the ERISA preemption doctrine in several significant decisions: FMC
Corp. v. Holliday,50 5 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,506 Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,507 Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,50 8
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,50 9 and Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc.510 In those decisions, the Supreme Court expressly held
that the preemption clause of ERISA provides that ERISA supersedes
all state laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit plan, except
state laws that regulate insurance.51' Recognizing that the preemption
provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, the Supreme Court ob-
served that Congress provided explicit direction that ERISA preempts
498. Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. O'Donnell, 627 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
499. Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
500. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. at 585, 314 S.W.2d at 776.
501. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
502. Id. § 1001(b).
503. Id. § 1001(b).
504. Id. § 1140. Under ERISA, an employer cannot discharge an employee "for exer-
cising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan...
or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such [employee]
may become entitled under the plan . . . ." Id
505. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
506. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
507. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
508. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
509. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
510. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).




common law causes of action filed in state court.512 The Fifth Circuit 513
and the Texas Supreme Court514 have repeatedly recognized ERISA's
broad preemption of common law claims that relate to an employee ben-
efit plan.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden51 5 the Supreme Court
addressed the definition of "employee" under ERISA. The Court
adopted a common law test for determining who qualifies as an "em-
ployee" under ERISA.51 6 Relying on its previous definition in Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid517 for an appropriate definition of
the general common law determination of an employee, 518 the Court re-
512. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 44-45.
513. Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1992) (ERISA preempted plain-
tiff's claims for breach of contract, violations of TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 and TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d
1209, 1218-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 68 (1992) (ERISA preempted claims for
fraud, civil conspiracy, breach of employment contract, unlawful interference with contract
rights, negligence and gross negligence); Lee v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 894 F.2d
755, 756-58 (5th Cir. 1990) (ERISA preempted fraud and negligent misrepresentation
claims); Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762-64 (5th Cir. 1989) (ERISA
preempted TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21); Boren v. N.L Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-
66 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3283 (1990) (ERISA preempted claim for breach
of contract); Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1293-97 (5th Cir. 1989) (ERISA
preempted plaintiff's breach of contract claim); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889,
893-95 (5th Cir. 1989) (ERISA preempted claim for breach of an oral agreement to pay
early retirement benefits); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d
1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1988) (ERISA preempted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negli-
gence, equitable estoppel, breach of contract and fraud).
514. Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 88 (1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract, common law
fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negli-
gence, statutory violations under TEX. INS. CODE ANN'm. arts. 3.62 and 21.21, violations of
applicable regulatory orders issued by the State Board of Insurance, and deceptive trade
practices under the TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46-.62); Southland Life Ins. Co. v.
Small, 806 S.W.2d 800, 801 (Tex. 1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims for breach of
contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligence, gross negli-
gence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Texas Insurance
Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 805
S.W.2d 387, 388-90 (Tex.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2855 (1991) (ERISA preempted plain-
tiff's claims under the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Pan
Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Erbauer Constr. Co., 805 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 86 (1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims for bad faith settlement practices in
violation of the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
515. 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992).
516. Id. at 1348.
517. 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989). -
518. Darden, 112 S. Ct. at 1348. Quoting Reid, the Court summarized the definition as
follows:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general com-
mon law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors
relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentali-
ties and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship be-
tween the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over
when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in
hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business
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jected the broad definition of employee under the Fair Labor Standards
Act and concluded that the "textual asymmetry" between FLSA and ER-
ISA precludes reliance on FLSA cases when construing the definition of
"employee" under ERISA.519
In Burks v. Amerada Hess Corp.5 20 Thomas Burks sustained an on-the-
job injury and filed a workers' compensation claim. Soon thereafter,
Amerada Hess Corporation (Hess) fired Burks, allegedly for using com-
pany property for his personal benefit during work hours. Burks sued
Hess for retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation and unlawful ter-
mination, all arising from his termination of employment and the denial
of his long-term benefits. Hess removed the case to federal court based
upon ERISA. After Burks amended his complaint, the federal district
court remanded the case to state court. Hess appealed the order of
remand.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit observed that the district court's order of
remand was based upon the rationale that it did not have discretion to
exercise jurisdiction over pendent state claims. 521 Because this reasoning
is not a ground for remand under section 1447(c), 522 the court noted that
it had jurisdiction to review the remand order.5 23 The court observed
that Burks' complaint was properly removed because Burks claimed that
his discharge constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress and
that the denial of long-term benefits was intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 524 The court held that Hess properly removed the case
and that Burks' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress aris-
ing from the denial of employee benefits was preempted by ERISA.
5 25
Finally, the court expressly disapproved of Burks' attempt at forum ma-
nipulation by deleting all of his federal claims to get the district court to
remand. 526 The court noted that the Supreme Court urged the lower fed-
of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 1348 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52).
519. Id at 1350.
520. 8 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1993).
521. Id. at 304.
522. 29 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1989). Section 1447(c) provides two grounds for remand: (1)
a defect in removal procedure and (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Burks, 8 F.3d at
304.
523. Burks, 8 F.3d at 304. The court observed that it had jurisdiction to review an order
of remand if the district court affirmatively states a non-section 1447(c) ground for remand.
Id at 304 n.4.
524. Id at 304.
525. Id. at 305.
526. Id. at 306. In Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir.
1990), the court stated:
[C]ourts should consider whether the plaintiff has attempted to manipulate
the forum in which his case will be heard simply by deleting all federal-law
claims from the complaint and requesting that the district court remand the




eral courts to guard against such manipulation by denying motions to re-
mand where appropriate.5 27
In Maldonado v. J.M. Petroleum Corp.528 the federal district court ad-
dressed the issue of whether ERISA preemption applies to damage
claims of the loss of pension benefits resulting from termination of em-
ployment. In Maldonado, Joe Maldonado filed suit in state court against
his former employer claiming race discrimination and wrongful termina-
tion. The employer removed the case to federal court by arguing that a
federal question under ERISA existed because Maldonado sought dam-
ages for the value of all lost employee benefits. The employer premised
the removal on the basis that the ERISA claim preempted all state
claims. Maldonado, on the other hand, sought a remand to state court.
The federal court agreed with Maldonado and held that federal jurisdic-
tion does not attach when the loss of pension benefits is merely a conse-
quence of a termination.529 Because the value of lost pension benefits is
calculable, ascertaining this value does not affect the integrity of the ben-
efit plan, endanger other pension benefits, nor hinder plan administra-
tion.530 Consequently, the court held that Maldonado's claim for the lost
value of employment, including retirement benefits, does not relate to
ERISA; therefore, the court granted Maldonado's motion to remand.
531
In Goldzieher v. Baylor College of Medicine5 32 Joseph Goldzieher filed
suit against his former employer, Baylor College of Medicine, contending
that Baylor breached its contract with Goldzieher to make contributions
on behalf of him to the Baylor pension plan. Baylor removed the case to
federal district court on the premise that Goldzieher's claim was covered
by the ERISA 533 and preempted Goldzieher's state law claims.
Goldzieher filed an amended complaint, alleging numerous state law
claims including breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, civil con-
spiracy and constructive fraud and an alternative claim for violation of
ERISA. Goldzieher moved to remand the case to state court which the
district court denied. The court determined that all of Goldzieher's
claims related to an employee benefit plan, i.e., Baylor's pension plan.
534
The court discounted Goldzieher's contention that the connection be-
tween the claims and ERISA was too tenuous to require preemption for
three reasons: Goldzieher's suit arose out of the alleged promise by Bay-
lor to contribute to the pension plan, the lawsuit involved issues between
Id. at 1255 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988)). See Fuerza
Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970, 975 (5th Cir. 1993) (approving language in
Brown).
527. Id. at 306 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).
528. 827 F. Supp. 1285 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
529. Id. at 1287 (citing Samuel v. Langham, 780 F. Supp. 424 (N.D. Tex. 1992)).
530. Id.
531. Id.
532. Goldzieher v. Baylor College of Medicine, No. H-93-0087 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15,
1994).
533. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
534. Goldzieher, slip op. at 15.
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ERISA entities, and its measure of damages rested solely upon the pen-
sion plan benefits.535 Therefore, Goldheizer's state law claims were pre-
empted by ERISA and properly removed to federal court.536
In Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirkgard537 several employees of
Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. (THE) were terminated for refusing to
sign a waiver of their rights under the Worker's Compensation Act. THE
asserted that the state court could not properly consider the former em-
ployees' claims because they involved THE's employee injury benefit
plan. THE contended that this plan falls under the purview of ERISA,
thereby preempting all state common law claims. The trial court dis-
agreed. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed.538 The court reasoned
that ERISA does not override state laws that preclude employers from
requiring employees to waive their common law rights.539 The court rea-
soned that the former employees' lawsuit did not address benefits under
the injury benefit plan, but rather the rights under common law.540
Therefore, the lawsuit did not fall under ERISA.5 41 The court then at-
tacked THE's injury benefit plan.542 The court explained that an employ-
ment agreement limiting a non-subscriber employer's liability for on-the-
job injuries is void as a matter of law543 because it is contrary to public
policy.5 "
In Hook v. Morrison Milling Company545 Morrison Milling (MMC) ap-
pealed the-federal district court's remand of Roxanne Hook's negligence
lawsuit. MMC, a non-subscriber under the Worker's Compensation Act,
attempted to replace the protections provided by that Act by creating a
benefit injury plan (the Plan). The Plan provides certain benefits for on-
the-job injuries suffered by MMC employees. MMC employees were not
required to participate in the Plan. However, if an MMC employee chose
to participate, the employee was required to sign a waiver of his or her
common law rights against MMC. Hook elected to participate in the Plan
when she first began her employment with MMC. Subsequently, Hook
suffered an on-the-job injury and filed a claim for benefits under the Plan.
Pursuant to the Plan, MMC provided over $5000 in benefits to Hook.
After MMC terminated Hook, she filed a wrongful discharge and negli-
gence action in Texas state court against MMC. MMC removed the case
to federal court on the theory that because Hook sought benefits arising
out of an benefit plan, her state law claims were preempted by ERISA.
535. Id. at 5-6.
536. Id. at 6.
537. Texas Health Enters., Inc. v. Kirkgard, 882 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1994, writ denied).




542. Id. at 634-35.
543. Id. at 634.
544. Id
545. Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776 (5th Cir. 1994).
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Hook sought a remand, claiming that the negligence action was not pre-
empted by ERISA. The district court agreed, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed. 546
After concluding that it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal from
the district court's remand order,547 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's remand order.5 48 The court held that Hook's claim was not pre-
empted by ERISA.549 The court reasoned that Hook's claim affected
only her employer-employee relationship and not her administrator-ben-
eficiary relationship with MMC. The court explained that Hook's unsafe
workplace claim did not equate to a suit for benefits under the Plan or a
complaint regarding the administration of the plan.5 50 The Fifth Circuit
also added that the waiver contained within MMC's plan did not trans-
form Hook's claim into a claim preempted by ERISA.551 Regardless of
the waiver, Hook's claim was for an unsafe work environment, not a
claim for improper administration of the ERISA plan waiver.552 There-
fore, Hook's claim was not preempted and the district court's order to
remand the case to state court was affirmed.55 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Each year the the common law as developed by the courts, and the
stautory law as enacted by the legislature, present employers with a com-
plex web of employment issues to address. This Survey is limited to de-
velopments in Texas common law and statutory law. Employers must
also be familiar with the significant number of federal decisions and fed-
eral legislation which impacts upon the workplace and the employment
relationship. With the increased level of attention of the "rights" of em-
ployees in the workplace, employers will always be confronted with more
- not fewer - employment laws and issues. Careful management and
defense counsel will closely monitor these matters. The economic risks
and costs associated with employment-related litigation demand close ex-
amination of employment develoments in the courts and the legislatures.
546. Id. at 786.
547. Id. at 780.
548. Id. at 783.
549. Id.
550. Id. at 784.
551. Id. at 785.
552. Id.
553. Id.
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